The Standard Chartered Bank plc saga, part I

I will not be alone in saying that the Standard Chartered Bank’s compliance problems with the New York State banking regulator (Department of Financial Services - DFS) caught me by surprise. 

I have been following this bank for several years, as it seemed to provide straight forward banking services internationally and made a good return in so doing.  Management seemed quite competent.  Finally, the fact that it had acquired what remained of American Express Bank Ltd. where I spent the first 16 years of my professional career added to my interest.  Actually, I was looking for a good entry point to invest in its stock.

However, the misdeeds that it allegedly committed and apparently did not contest as well as what has transpired so far about its senior management’s conduct have led me to suspend any investment attempt.

Essentially, the bank was accused of willingly defying US regulations forbidding banks to channel money of sanctioned countries such as Iran through the US.  The DFS accused it of laundering more than $250 billion over several years through its US banking operations, of falsifying internal records to prevent regulators from tracing the identity of its Iranian clients and of filing untrue reports.  That a major bank decide, in a very big way, to defy the laws of its host country is simply baffling.

The reaction of senior and top management in this whole affair further raised alarm bells in my mind.  There was of course the now infamous email exchange between the Head of US operations and his superior in which the former clearly outlined the dangers of the bank’s course of action and the latter replied “who these f*** Americans think they are to tell us what to do”.  There was also the truculent initial response to the DFS action stating that only $14 million of transfers had been mishandled and that the bank was contemplating countersuing for damage to its reputation!  This from a bank that had been under Federal oversight from 2004 to 2007 for money laundering.  Then, in short order, the bank agreed to settle with the DFS, paying $340 million and accepting renewed oversight.  As Butch Cassidy asked the Sundance Kid in the eponymous movie, “Who are these guys”? 

What is worrying in this case is that this is not an instance where a low level trader decides to go rogue.  It is likely that the decision to continue doing business with Iran was vetted by the very top management; the Board of Directors was probably at least aware of the decision/policy, and if it was not, then more serious questions must be asked.  What management decides to choose Iran over the US?  What kind of senior manager blurts out the f*** word when referring to the Congress of a host country?  So far, I find no reassuring answers.  Either we are dealing with a culture or a strategic problem. 

The cultural hypothesis is that the top echelons of the bank include throwbacks to the Indian days of the British Empire, except that New York is not a remote outpost in the bush.  When a senior manager not only refuses to listen to his country manager’s cogent alert and advice but also responds with unrestrained fury, when the corporation lets it be known of its intent to counter sue its regulator for damage to its reputation, under the circumstances, I, for one, wonder about the culture of the place.

The strategic hypothesis is that the bank’s main focus is emerging markets, many of which, by definition, are less closely regulated than developed ones, often condone business practices which would be frown upon elsewhere, and in some cases are governed by regimes which are not models of good behavior.  New York is important to the bank for providing access to the US dollar system, but the Americas-Europe-UK segment accounted for only 10% of Standard’s operating income in 2011.  In that sense, and in my view, the bank probably has a higher risk profile than generally acknowledged.

Bottom line, the US regulatory and judicial process is not over by a long shot as the Federal Reserve, Treasury and the Justice Department are still to conclude their own enforcement actions.  I am among those who applaud the DFS decision to go public and break the apparently stalled multi-party negotiations.  I found the allegations against the bank shocking (called me an old-fashioned banker). 

Finally, having myself spent most of my banking and investing careers in emerging markets, I have come to the conclusion that the Standard Chartered business model is riskier than previously thought, and more importantly, that such higher risk profile is unlikely to be easily reduced. 

At some point under the right circumstances and at the right price, the bank may become an interesting investment or trading idea.  

“Allo, Don Enrique?”

Two weeks, Robert Zoellick, the outgoing president of the World Bank, advised European leaders to “break the glass” and get into emergency salvage mode.  A less violent option, but one that would likely be just as effective, would be to make a single phone call.

By that I mean calling former Tresaury Secretary Hank Paulson, granting him dual US and Spanish citizenship and offering him the job of Secretario de Hacienda of the Kingdom of Spain.

The latest saga of the Spanish banking sector bailout was in line with previous efforts: vague, not definitive and indefinite as to the timeline. 

The Spanish government hired two consultants to assess the banking sector’s capital needs.  Two scenarios were considered, a central one and a stressed one.  This move was precipitated by the very poor handling of the Bankia bailout so far. 

The results are in.  Under the base scenario, the banking system would need €16 to €25 billion; under the stressed one it would need €51- €62 billion.  This is to compare with the IMF estimate of at least €40 billion and the Eurozone members agreement to make available of up to €100 billion. Oh, one last point, Spanish sovereign debt was to be a non factor in this study, a pretty big fudge if there was one.

So, what then?  Well, not much really.  The two government officials presenting the results repeatedly referred to the consultants'  as an “exercise” and pointed out that under the central scenario there was no need for capital injection.   Put it another way, if the sun keeps shining, there is no need to buy an umbrella.  Later, and confusingly, Bankia announced that it would not need any public money even under the stressed scenario (presumably, non-Spanish governments' money is not public money).

There was also no immediate call for action.  The top three banks, BBVA, Santander and la Caixa, didn’t need more capital under either scenario according to one of the consultants.  The Spanish government stated that the problems were limited to the banks it had seized, that their auction would be postponed and that there likely would be no bank closing as this was deemed too expensive an option.  The recapitalization numbers were not broken up by bank.  Bank-specific audits would be released by September 30.  Then banks would submit their recapitalization plans, and those that could access the markets (in whose judgment?) would be given up to one year to comply.  In other words, the sector recapitalization could extend into late 2013 before it was completed!

If this feels like a trip to Alice in Wonderland, it is because it is.  It is also an accident waiting to happen.

Knowing what they know today, I am sure that Secretary Paulson (and the Fed) would handle the Lehman crisis differently.  But one weakness that Sec. Paulson doesn’t have is being wishy-washy.  In 2008, as panic gripped the US markets, he swiftly convinced the President and Congress to recapitalize our tops banks with government money.  He then proceeded to impose his decision on bank managements in one afternoon.

A few months later under the Obama Administration, credible stress tests were conducted on the top US banks, the individual results were made public and the banks wasted no time announcing voluntary recapitalizations.  Over the 2008-2009 period, several very large banks were closed and/or sold to financially solid competitors.

Having waited too long, Spain is now in a difficult position and needs outside help to shore up its banks.  However, having admitted to weakness, Spain should take prompt and forceful action.  Such decisiveness might even improve the terms of the bank bail out, making it more convincing and effective.  I don’t know how good Sec. Paulson’s Spanish is, but I think it is good enough.  Make the call!

European hieroglyphics

You can find anything on the Internet, even a site that translates English into hieroglyphics.  According to Quizland.com, the tablet at left says “We do not understand financial markets”, and it could be the motto of the Eurozone leaders.

In its rejection of Anglo-saxon free markets, Europe has been under the delusion that these can be willed away or bent to the wishes of political and other leaders.  One can recall Mr. Trichet, then president of the European Central Bank, flatly stating that Greece would not restructure its sovereign debt, and his “ruling” being repeated by a large chorus of European politicians; or President Sarkozy, after each summit with Chancellor Merkel, declaring that the debt problems had been solved by the negotiation of a new memorandum of understanding and that markets would thus have to fall in line.

When this didn’t work, several futile ideas were proposed, like creating local credit rating agencies (presumably under close scrutiny from eurozone governments) to write credible reports yet refrain from calling for unwanted debt downgrades.  As pressure kept mounting, intricate rescue plans were offered, which had the principal merit of multiplying euros earmarked for intervention funds as if they were fish and loaves of bread.

This state of mind isn’t unique to politicians and bureaucrats; it is shared by bankers as well.  For years, the top banks of Europe have operated under the guidance and protection of their governments.  In so doing, they ended up believing the messages delivered to the “gullible masses”, that the state always gets it way, and that, by staying in the governmental wake, so would they.  This led many banks to rely excessively on wholesale funding, to under-reserve, to feel comfortable with lopsided loans-to-deposits ratios and to be undercapitalized. 

Eurozone banks believed that they could bluff their way through the current crisis.  Indeed, only one, Unicredito from Italy, had the courage to raise $10 billion of fresh capital at a huge discount to market price.  But markets quickly wised up, forcing a liquidity crisis at the same time as a solvency one was worsening.  By then, the most exposed Spanish banks couldn’t access the markets.

The solution to the latest Iberic crisis is true to form, so far: opaque, uncertain as to timing and bound to close markets further.  Opaque because such terms as interest rate, final maturity and conditions have not been disclosed; uncertain as it is not clear whether Spain has formally asked for a rescue package for its banks and what the trigger for recapitalization would be; finally, the recapitalization will be funded by loans to a Spanish agency, thereby increasing that country’s debt burden, and will be chanelled through the ESM to assure seniority over private creditors; this will make future access to the markets that much more difficult. 

The causes of Greece and Spain’s financial troubles are different, but in both cases the eurozone rescue packages, while clearly designed to reduce risks for the institutions that provide help, in effect raise them.  Greece private creditors were handed a 75% effective loss (which has risen to 80% since) to insulate official creditors, and official creditors gained preferred status on the money they lent to Greece.  The private creditors’ loss is greater than the 75% one forced a decade ago by Argentina which was (rightly) characterized as an effective spoliation. Greece abandonned a very reasonable €50 billion privatization program.  Sovereign  bond contracts were retroactively amended by the state.  Net net, financial markets have no rational motivation to return to Greece any time soon and eurozone states are now ‘it”.

In Spain, the sovereign debt will be raised by some 12% to fund the bank rescue, it is not clear what reforms will be required of the recipients, whether the bad banks will be liquidated and how much further help will be needed by the government.  If the bank rescue loans rank ahead of regular sovereign bonds, it is pretty clear that any holder of Spanish, or maybe even Italian, government bonds better sell them in a hurry.  This will leave the eurozone countries to hold the bag, except that their bag of tricks will soon be too small.  At the end of the day, a lack of capital in Spanish banks was remedied with an increase in debts of the Spanish state.

As the eurozone dithers, risks of implosion are rising.  When one country after the other receives financial assistance, it drops out from the pool that will fund the next sovereign borrower in need.  Clearly, Germany, being the last one in line, is on the hook to fund everybody unless the process is changed. 

Spain is make-or-break for the eurozone.  If it fails, Italy gets into the line of fire and, in my opinion, Germany leaves the eurozone because it would have neither the means nor the desire to mortgage its future to save everybody in the eurozone.

What can be done?  If I were head of government in the eurozone, I would try to prepare for the day when Germany refuses to help out.  This means controlling public spending in a way that is politically acceptable: means testing programs, reducing civil servant headcount through attrition and, inevitably, across the board spending cuts as well as some tax increases.  More controversial would be labor laws reform to foster hiring of the young and, yes, pension reform.  These last two issues are hazardous to a president job security, but the payoff is worth a try.  Mr. Hollande has demanded that the CEOs of public sector companies limit their salaries to 20 times that of their employees and that the CEOs in the private sector likewise restrain themselves.  This may be nothing more than demagoguery, or it may be the necessary first step to ask everybody to share in the pain. 

Finally, the deleveraging pain could be alleviated by privatizing public assets.  According to Mr. Stark, ex-board member of the ECB, Greece has over €300 billion in public assets it could sell.  It was supposed to sell €50 billion.  Spain, Italy and France have much more to sell.  Markets can be of great use in gathering funds and setting fair prices for public assets.  Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the UK did it not so many years ago.  It could and should be done today. 

Perhaps another reason why I think that it is crucial that European countries accelerate reforms on their own NOW is that I have real doubts about the future of the eurozone: I am pretty sure that if it survives it will be as a reduced group of more homogeneous countries. Even then, I wonder if ”deep integration is possible”. 

Are most of the eurozone inhabitants willing to let Brussels bureaucrats run their lives?

Are the French willing to align their labor laws and retirement age and benefits on those of Germany?


Short of a full federation US-style, how much, or little, integration do you need to run a common currency alliance on a sustainable basis?  The truth is that we don’t know. 

There is a big world out there, and if it is that big it is thanks to free markets.  Europe's mistake has been to be built to keep the barbarians out, so to speak.  Relatively less effort was dedicated to pool resources and compete on the world stage.  If the eurozone is to succeed, it needs to be redesigned to make a core Europe as competitive as it can be on the world stage.

By the way, the Tweety Bird standing over the English lawn means “no” in hieroglyphics. 

I could have been a contender!

Bummer, they cut me, I’m off the team.  It was a blast while it lasted though.  Imagine, on the same 4x100 free relay with Michael Phelps, Ryan Lochte and Nathan Adrian!  I thought it was a long shot, a good joke really, but no, I got to be part of the team and practice with these guys in Colorado Springs for almost a week before I got the word, you’re out.

It all started on a whim; I sent to the powers that be a photo of a CTS scoreboard with my name on it and my time for the 100, 48”60.  I guess they were real impressed because they sent me an email, backed by a written invitation via Fedex, to come up.  Sure, I looked older - actually I could have been the grandfather of any of my team mates - and as muscular as Popeye before he gulps down his spinach, but hey, 48”60!

I did explain that I needed to use flippers for kicking sets because it helped build up lactic acid faster and therefore was more challenging;  I also avoided racing sets because of a tender rotator cuff.  I got some strange looks, but in the end, they let me do my stuff.  The food was great, I really liked my Ralph Lauren USA sweatsuit, and being with the guys was a blast.

I guess the fun could have gone on for a while longer had we not been dragged to a charity event to race a strong local team of Boys 10 and Under, and lost.  Michael stormed out of the pool, Ryan had a good laugh and Adrian’s eyes rolled back into their sockets.  The coaches were not amused and got real unpleasant: 

-          “What the heck were you doing out there, looking for clams!  And what’s your name again?”

-          “Euh, well …. I can explain but no need to blow a fuse …”

So I did explain; the CTS photo was real enough, except that I had photoshopped it a bit; you see, the actual time was 1’08”46, and no, it wasn’t a long course meter time but a short course yard one.  Anyway, there were pissed and I thought it was unfair because they were all of a sudden nitpicking everything when they had welcome me as one of the boys, as a real contender.

That’s why I do feel great sympathy for the Greeks, I mean, they photoshopped some stats and reports and the like, but it was all in good fun and the Europeans should have realized it from the start, and now the poor Greeks are the butt of unseemly sarcasm and threats of expulsion.  Christine Lagarde of the IMF is even demanding that they pay their taxes!

But you know, there is life after the Eurozone just like there is after Colorado Springs.  Greece is no more competitive within the EU than I was in the pool.  When you “restructure” your privately held sovereign debt and your creditors take an 81%[1] loss, and you still can’t carry your remaining debt, you don’t really belong in the same club as the AA and AAA rated members.  More importantly, you need a break, a devaluation, to adjust your costs, otherwise, you starve yourself to death and/or you have a revolution on your hands.  During the Asian crisis, the Russian ruble devalued 333%, from 6 to 26 to the dollar, making exports of goods very competitive, and while inflation shot up in the fourth quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999, it then slowed down considerably.

While Greece should exit the Eurozone, it doesn’t need to leave the European Union.  Some may argue that Greece should stay within the Eurozone and carry out the reforms needed to regain competitiveness.  The problem is that these reforms, politically and socially, would take years to be implemented (more time than financial markets would allow), and success would not be assured.  Even then, given its demography, economic structure and size, Greece can’t rely solely on cost cuts to be competitive with the likes of Germany, Holland and France; so it still needs a one-time large devaluation to close the gap, and perhaps a continuing one to stay within range.  Either way, it would be a hard slog, and it may be that Greece chooses to follow a different path, of less stress and slower growth.

A good relay must be made up of swimmers of comparable caliber who also get along well together.  The same goes for a political and economic federation of countries.  People point out to the example of the USA at the end of the 18^th century as a possible model for the Eurozone.  I would say that the (voting) Americans of that time had more much more in common than the EU today:  they were Anglo-Saxon, spoke English and had left Europe to found a new country common values.  The Europeans of today are far more diverse, don’t speak the same language and don’t (yet) want to be governed by bureaucrats from Brussels.

Perhaps a smaller eurozone will survive, with the necessary fiscal and political integration. This may not be the best outcome, as it may not respond to popular aspirations and would codify a two or three-speed EU.  A better solution may be a Europe of Nations, as envisaged by de Gaulle back in the 1960s, but one accepting enough fiscal and monetary coordination so as to facilitate a system of floating currencies whose exchange rates will be confined to a wide band that will accommodate some differences in policies and economic cycles; an improved “snake in the tunnel” of the 1970s if you wish (it is interesting to note that, in the end, only Germany, the Benelux and Denmark stayed in the tunnel).

Step up …get set …

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[1]  It was estimated at 75% initially, but since then, Greek yields have skyrocketed.

A few thoughts on JP Morgan’s hedging loss

JP Morgan announced yesterday that its Chief Investment Office had incurred a loss of $2 billion on derivative trading undertaken for the purpose of hedging its loan portfolio.  This loss in turn had been partially offset by $1 billion of realized gains in regular trading.  JPM’s Jamie Dimon further warned that the CIO loss could rise or fall substantially until the derivative positions were undone.

As a shareholder, I was surprised by the announcement and I am not happy.  In the charged regulatory and political climate of Washington, we can expect all kinds of theater; Congress has already announced hearings on the matter; the SEC and the New York State Attorney have announced inquiries.  While the stock has fallen 9% already, it could fall further.

There some troubling aspects to this loss:  (1) how could these derivative positions lose so much money in so little time? (2) market rumors of excessive position building seem to have preceded JPM’s top management awareness of the magnitude of the problem, (3) how could anyone believe that building a position, big enough so as to be illiquid, be a good way to hedge a portfolio? (4) if indeed the short hedges lost money, there should have been a commensurate gain on the asset side JPM balance sheet.

Beyond the above questions, there are some more fundamental issues: (1) is this incident evidence that JPM has become too big to manage, even for as detailed-oriented a manager as Mr. Dimon, or is this proof that even the best falter sometimes? (2) there have been reports, unconfirmed so far, that those responsible for hedging at CIO had recently been expected to show a profit as well; (3) old-time bankers like me remember when the kind of derivatives JPM used didn’t exist, yet banks tried to protect against portfolio losses by having ample capital and  building general loan loss reserves in good times; shouldn’t regulators and banks take another look at these remedies?

I will close with two observations:  having pulled through the crisis unscathed, JPM has not been bashful about its prowess.  Its CEO can come across as arrogant at times, and I can see how many officers at the bank, by assimilation, could consider themselves as the new masters of the banking universe; hubris can be as dangerous, in its own way, as lack of competence.  Although it is purely a personal speculation of mine, I believe that the huge cost of litigation and regulation is pushing banks to make up for lost profits in every nook and cranny, in the case of JPM in what used to be a hedging activity.  Ironically, Congress and state attorney generals have some paternity in the JPM loss.

Clearly, JPM has built huge derivatives positions that it can’t easily close.  Market participants will quickly figure out which these are, if they don’t know already, and bid against JPM.  This is why Mr. Dimon warned about volatility and his determination to use his balance sheet not to be forced into untimely liquidation.  Consequently, it is prudent, in the absence of detailed information which is unlikely to be aired publicly, to assume that JPM could incur a bigger loss than the above gross $2 billion.

Even if the gross loss number were doubled to $4 billion, or about $1.05/share , pre-tax, the tangible book value at the end of the year is likely to be close to $36 [1] per share.  I would think that buying below that level would represent an interesting opportunity.  After all, the bank is well diversified, has plenty of capital and, despite this embarrassing loss, well managed.

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[1] $34.5 tangible book at 3/31 + $4.7 of earning - $2.1 of net loss - $1.2 of dividends.  Book value would rise to $49.1.  I have assumed no net share buyback for the rest of the year.

Culture, matches and dark matter

As a value investor who has spent most of his career dealing with emerging markets, I have always felt that the role of culture in risk assessment has consistently been underestimated. 

This is so because national cultures evolve very slowly;  George Kennan famously observed that Custine’s Letters from Russia, written in the 1800s, were the best guide to Stalin’s Soviet Union and still quite relevant to Brezhnev’s.

Another example of this phenomenon is how the culture of conquered nations, over time, prevailed over that of its invaders.  Think of Gaul and the Roman armies, or Mexico and the Spanish conquistadores.

Finally, when assessing sovereign credit risks, it is the willingness as much as the ability to pay that defines which country defaults and which doesn’t.  Some countries, like Argentina and Greece, have had a history of throwing in the towel faster or pushing for deeper haircuts than others.

But culture is also what defines corporations, for better or for worst.  In a sense, it is like the dark matter in the universe, you can’t see it but you can feel its influence.

I thought about that when the Fed disclosed the results of its stress tests on the top 19 banks in the US.  Clearly, the tests were quantitative, the results being produced by some mathematical models or simulations.  Most banks that passed saw their stock prices soar, and in my view rightly so.  Truth be told that I was long JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo.  But should we take these results as a license to buy or, in the case of those that failed, to sell?

I would put at least as much weight in corporate culture as I would on the test results.  Why?  Because good culture is the ultimate safety net.  CEOs can say whatever they want, put out “bibles”, codes of conducts and the like, but they can’t vet every employee’s decision, or lack thereof.  Down in the trenches, a strong culture will stop (or limit) wrongdoings, let an employee ask for help or quickly admit to a mistake.

Strong banks exhibit discipline in lending, respect for credit analysis; they also foster a culture of spending restraint, and they pass along their values as much informally (meaning face to face) as they do through formal seminars and written materials.

In banking, financial liabilities in banking are 10 to 15 times as large as capital; that compares with zero to 1 time in industry and commerce.  Consequently, the margin of error is far smaller in banks vs. industrials, and the importance of corporate culture that much greater, in my view.

Warren Buffett likes to tell that he looks to invest in companies that enjoy wide moats, meaning by that companies whose competitive position is well defended.  I think of good culture as a wide moat too, against threats from inside, and sometimes, too a lesser extent, from outside.

But good culture, professional reputation and honor if you will, is easily lost.  As Marcel Pagnol’s character, César, famously said[1], “honor is like matches, you can only use it once”.

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[1] To his son in the play Marius.

The second shoe to drop

It is remarkable that, so far, the global crisis which started in 2007, has had very few disruptive fallouts in the political domain.  There have been two casualties so far, Prime Ministers Berlusconi and Papandreou in Italy and Greece respectively.  In both cases, traditional parties have rallied behind governments led by technocrats and have approved austerity budgets.  In the US, where it all started, the situation is even more benign:  after causing a stir and some concerns, the Tea Party has overplayed its hand and failed to organize into a potent force, and President Obama, while inspiring faint enthusiasm, may be reelected come November.

Yet this may change.  Indeed, as governments in Europe, and soon in the US, cut spending (including social benefits) and raise taxes in order to reduce public debts and balance their budgets, populations may well revolt and seek alternatives.

In particular, the perception that such sacrifices are demanded by a foreign power, such as Germany, or by faceless financial markets which have been demonized by politicians and the media, combined with the absence of tangible forthcoming benefits may well cause populations to balk, to reject further austerity and loss of purchasing power, and to become receptive to the most demagogic promises of fringe politicians.

Granted this didn’t happen in the US during the Great Depression, but it did in Europe and I would argue that the explosion of media and social electronic networks make such a threat more serious today. Although in a different context, the Arab Spring is the clearest illustration of how a movement can gather irresistible strength.

In particular, what we are witnessing today is the squeezing of the middle-class throughout the West, and such a trend is unlikely to stop any time soon.

In April 1932, the liberal journalist Paul Scheffer of the Berliner Tageblatt wrote a powerful article on Hitler and how he seduced a despondent German middle-class.  This article was reproduced in the January/February issue of Current Affairs, and I am reproducing an extract here.

Hopefully, we will avoid a similar fate. But I do expect that, while the Great Recession mostly impacted financial markets and economies initially, it will have a much larger impact on politics and government in the next few years.

Le radeau de la Méduse

This painting by Gericault, one of the most famous of the French Romantic School, depicts survivors of the shipwreck of the frigate La Méduse as they are to be rescued by the brick Argus.  The disaster was caused by incompetent leadership and resulted in over 150 deaths.  The survivors picked from the raft resorted to cannibalism to survive.

It is too soon to compare the current travails of the eurozone with those of the sailors of La Méduse, but surely it isn’t to say that a euro shipwreck looks increasingly possible.

The latest report by the IMF on Greece is sobering.  The Greek economy is weaker than anticipated, the pace of structural reforms is slower (partly as a result of bureaucratic resistance, partly as a result of poor implementation); bank deposits keep on shrinking, credit to enterprises is falling, competitiveness is marginally improving, mostly as a result of dismissals.

While large institutional bank creditors had “voluntarily” agreed to a “haircut” of 50% on their Greek public bonds, rumor has it that the government wants to apply it only to the nominal value of the debt; by offering very low interest rates and extending maturities it would increase the effective “haircut” to 75%.

Greece is in a bind as the IMF, ECB and other euro governmental credits are exempted from the “haircuts” so that private creditors bear the brunt of the restructuring.  As I wrote in a previous note, there is little difference between a 75% haircut and reneging on one’s debts.  Argentina is a good example of that, and it has been a decade since it hasn’t been able to tap international bond markets.

Furthermore, can Greece fail to pay 75% of its public debts and still belong to the eurozone?  Can Greece restructure its public debts, exchanging them for new bonds worth 25% of the originals, and still characterize the process as voluntary? The answer is no and no.

Initially, I thought that the insistence by several European heads of state that the exchange be voluntary was nothing more than pride.  Now, I wonder.  What if big European banks had been sellers of CDS (credit default swaps)[1]?  Why not?  After all, the underlying credit risk was supposed to be zero; what a better business than selling for thousands of euros protection (CDS) against a risk that was non-existent (sovereign default)? 

European banks may have sold relatively few Greek CDS, but they may have sold tons of French, Italian and Spanish CDS, and a formal default in Greece would, at the very least, force these banks to provision against the other countries’ CDS because the myth of zero-risk eurozone would disappear.  Provisioning is a euphemism for taking a (big) loss.  I did look into the exposure of BNP and other banks to European sovereign debt but these banks only disclosure their exposure in their banking books, not in their trading books, which is very unfortunate under the circumstances.

The only way for Greece not to, in effect, renege on its obligations is for the IMF, the ECB and other euro governmental creditors to share in the losses of restructuring.  If not, Greece is out of the eurozone, with all the implications it carries for the rest of the area.  Even then, it is difficult to see how Greece will improve its competitiveness and enable its economy to grow fast enough, particularly given the European austerity and deleveraging policies.  At the end of the day, I can’t see how Greece stays in the eurozone.

The other eurozone members face different but equally daunting problems.  One is the fragility of their banking system.  In the US, banks account for 1/3 of total credit and capital markets for 2/3.  In Europe, the proportions are reversed yet banks have less capital and less stable funding (their ratio of loans/deposits being well over 1.0).  In recent weeks, big European banks have announced extensive divestiture programs to strengthen their balance sheets.  This may be good at the micro level, but it is bad at the macro, leading straight to recession.  And then there is the CDS question raised above.

European governments could have forced their hands with their equivalent of a TARP program (by far the most successful US effort to stem the 2007-2008 financial crisis).  Yet they shied away, afraid of jeopardizing their credit ratings.  This was a terrible mistake.  The financial situation will not improve until banks get stronger, and sovereign ratings will drop unless forceful governmental action is taken.

The other problem is existential.  Member countries share a goal but not the means to reach it.  They want to be a powerful economic bloc but they do not want to pay the price for it but harmonizing their fiscal and social policies, and in the process relinquishing some degree of sovereignty.  They desire a common currency but refuse to let the ECB back member states private banks not to mention member state public debts.  Finally, member state populations, when asked, reject the idea of a Brussels command, yet they now have to accept one from Berlin and, yes, Brussels.

As the situation worsens and tensions rise, the survivors are warily eyeing each other; numerous meetings have shown that they are unable to reach big decisions (such as recapitalizing their banks, getting the ECB to step up to the plate) or to display real solidarity.  The sniping has started (witness the French/UK[2] war of words on credit ratings) and will get worse. 

For all of the demonstrations of coordination and harmony, it is clear that Germany is the leader of the eurozone and France is the more equal of the rest.  When de Gaulle envisioned l’Europe des Nations, he meant not to relinquish sovereignty to Brussels; today, it has been relinquished in part to Berlin.  President Sarkozy will no doubt continue to play the game until the elections; doing otherwise would mean acknowledging a reality which the French dislike. 

Afterwards, changes are inevitable.  Pulling up to Germany’s level would require huge changes in labor laws and a shrinking of the public sector which seem beyond Mssrs. Sarkozy or Hollande powers.  France can’t revert to the age-old French/English/Prussian triangulation because the UK are outside the eurozone.  Italy, under strong leadership, could offer France some of the balance it wants.  Still, Italy would not offer a real triangulation, and as a result, I think that France will wish for less European integration rather than more, for a gaullian Europe of Nations so to speak.  Ironically, in so doing it would get closer to the UK position.

Perhaps a slowly healing US and resilient BRICs will give Europe six months to a year to avoid disaster.  But the pressure will not abate, the price to pay will not drop.  In the end, a Europe of Nations is more representative of the continent’s two millennia of history than a contrived eurozone.

Germany could mitigate the strength of its new currency by preserving a mini eurozone with Austria and the Netherlands.

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[1]  This is a question that hedge fund manager David Einhorn has also been asking.

[2]   I know, the UK is not part of the eurozone.

Market prices are what they are

Market prices are what they are, and it is an exercise in futility to argue with them; if you think they are too low, buy; if they seem too high, sell; or you can just stay away if they look too confusing.

As I am writing this note, consider this.  The French 10 year euro-bond yields 3.511% p.a. to maturity.  This bond is rated AAA.  The Brazilian 10 year dollar bond yields 3.486%, yet it is rated BBB.  Finally, the Colombian 10 year dollar bond yields 3.662% and is rated BBB-.

In other words, markets rank France just below Brazil whose credit rating is eight levels below, and only two levels above the investment grade floor.  Markets put France barely above Colombia which is rated nine levels below and barely investment grade.

Most musings by the press and economists point to France’s credit rating being lowered but remaining within the high investment grade zone (AAA to AA-).  But markets put France barely within the investment grade category; markets price in the possibility of a small loss or haircut. 

Actually, “small haircut” is an oxymoron: no country will be forced or willingly go into default simply to reduce its debts by 5% or 10%.  Rather, the small loss is actually an expected value: a given level of haircut or loss times a probability number.  So is it 30% x 2%? Or 20% x 10%?  Who knows. 

What markets are saying is that this probability number is no longer zero and that, barring strong European political will (which is so far conspicuously absent), it could be anything.

On the other hand, one could also question how strong the economies and financial systems of Brazil and Colombia would be if Europe were to spiral into chaos and the US would continue to twiddle its thumbs.  With all due respect to Brazil and Colombia, I have always thought that emerging market investment grade was another oxymoron.

So what will it be?  It is fair to say that France is no longer a AAA borrower, at least not until it makes some reforms that it has shied away from.  It is probably a AA- or an A+, three to four levels below AAA.  At the same time, I cannot rationalize buying Colombia or Brazil at current yield levels.  Would you buy buy Brazilian or Colombian bonds paying a nominal annual return of 3.5% to 3.7% if you had to hold them for 10 years, come what may?
.

Unless you are convince that a Japanese-like decade of deflation is coming, I find it very difficult to buy any sovereign bond at current yields. 

Are European banks undercapitalized?

This is the subject of fierce discussions nowadays.  My view is that they are, and by a significant margin.

Capital is the ultimate cushion to absorb unexpected losses and to inspire confidence from market counterparties and customers.  In other words, carrying sufficient capital is an essential element of risk management and a cost of doing business.  Banks and their critics have argued that other elements need be considered as well, such as funding, customer profiles and reserve policies.

All of this is true.  European banks, by and large, rely more on wholesale funding than their US counterparts; this is evident when one compares ratios of loans to core deposits.  On the other hand, European banks point out that they do not net out derivative positions as American banks are allowed to do, and this is also true.

Perhaps the most telling indicator that European banks are undercapitalized is the fact that their risk weighted assets, against which they need to carry capital, represent a much lower proportion of total assets than they do at American banks.

To illustrate this point, we have selected four of the largest and best European and American banks.  Both European and American exponents include one bank with strong exposure to investment banking and one with a greater exposure to traditional commercial banking.  They are JP Morgan (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) on one side of the Atlantic and BNP Paribas (BNP) and Deutsche Bank (DB) on the other.  For the European banks, we have also used their adjusted total asset numbers, meaning as reduced by netting out derivatives positions.

The results are eye opening:

	JPM at 9/30	WFC at 9/30	BNP at 6/30	DB at 6/30
Total adjusted assets	$2,289	$1,305	$2,175	$1,750
Risk weighted assets per Basel I	$1,221	$982	$863	$464
Ratio of TA/RWA	53%	75%	40%	27%

Let me reiterate that all four banks are presenting their financial results in accordance with the rules and regulations applicable to them.  I would also note that Wells Fargo is the closest to traditional banking, so that it makes sense that it has the highest TA/RWA ratio.  But recent history has shown that there is no such thing as a riskless financial asset.  Based on this observation, BNP and DB carry much less capital in relation to their total assets than JPM and WFC, and they are more exposed to a riskless asset, like a sovereign bond, suddenly becoming "risky" and therefore deserving of a capital cushion. 

From a common sense point of view, I submit that it is less risky to make relatively small loans to millions of customers who have checking and savings accounts with you than to hold billions in sovereign bonds or to extend billions in credit lines to banks whose actual risk profile is known, if at all, only to their management.

This is not to say that European banks should be demonized or punished.  It is close to impossible for major banks not to hold bonds from their own governments, and the dicier public finances get, the greater the pressure heaped on them to increase these holdings.  It is also understandable that, as the European Union developed and matured, they would want to expand their operations in neighboring countries.  Italy, now in the gun-sight of everybody, was a founding member of the European Community for Coal and Steel, back in 1951, and of every subsequent iteration up to the present day EU.

In that sense, these banks were not guilty of gross misbehavior, like making loans to borrowers who could not afford to pay current interest.  I can sympathize with European CEOs who clamor for their countries to get their act together and shore up their budgets and public borrowing needs.

But at the end of the day, counterparties and customers will determine the profitability and even the fate of European banks, or at least of their management and shareholders.  In this regards, European banks have been too cute, relying on rules that were too good to be true.  Perhaps because they enjoy much closer rapport with their governments than American ones do, they have forgotten that markets can quickly get unforgiving and ignore the best Power Point presentations.

With some exceptions, European banks need to raise fresh capital, now.