Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts

Friday, April 28, 2017

Update on the quest for the Graal

As we get closer to the second round of the presidential elections, the deep divisions within the population and the political parties are getting starker. 

-         -  55% of the population voted neither for Macron nor for Le Pen; what will they do on May 10[1]? 
-         -  Traditional parties and their candidates gathered just 27% of the votes; how will they rebuild, starting with these elections?
-         -  84% of the French were unhappy with the Hollande government and presumably wanted change, but for many Le Pen offers too much and Macron not enough.

The above 55% have a choice: pick another candidate or abstain.  It is always difficult for a losing candidate to recommend that his supporters vote for somebody else, unless of course this helps him advance (or save) his career.

So far, this reluctance combined with voters’ ambivalence about the remaining candidates has led to a rise in abstention expectations for the second round.

Melanchon refuses to endorse either Macron or Le Pen while Dupont Aignan is rallying Le Pen.  The most recent polls indicate that 28% of Fillon’s, 45% of Melanchon’s, and 29% of the Hamon’s voters intend to abstain.

At present, Macron is currently holding to a greater percentage of left-wing voters (40% of Melanchon’s) than Le Pen is to Fillon’s (29%).  Combined with the above abstention levels, this makes Macron difficult to beat. 

If we assume that those who voted for the outliers (Poutou, Asselineau, Arthaud[2]) will vote for Le Pen, then the second round should yield a 59%-41% victory for Macron[3].

This clear margin of victory is not rock solid, for several reasons:

-         - Besides his 24%, Macron needs votes from Les Républicains (which probably views him as too soft and linked to the cabale which plotted the fatal attack on its champion, Fillon), from the revolutionary Left (which has even less in common with him) and from the socialists (who have nowhere else to go if they want to salvage a future, but who probably feel betrayed).  In other words, Macron needs the votes of people who don’t share much with him except a dislike of Le Pen. 

-         -  He is not a seasoned campaigner, he doesn’t work a crowd like Marine Le Pen and yes, he is very young and it shows at times. 

-         -  The May 3 debate with Le Pen will be a high stake one.  If he loses 4% of the Fillon votes to her, and if she convinces half of the Melanchon voters tempted by abstention to vote for her, she wins by the narrowest of margin.   

-        -   Even if he were to squeeze by, he needs a clear victory to herd the parliamentary cats into a working coalition.

    The election is Macron to lose, he shouldn’t, but he could.



[1]  Date of the second round of the presidential elections.
[2]  Representing respectively the New Anticapitalist Party, the Republican Union and Workers’ Struggle).
[3]  We also use the same polls'estimates of how Macron and Le Pen will win over supporters of the candidates who lost in the first round.

Sunday, March 5, 2017

Playing with Fire

The Colombian presidential elections of April 1970 pitted Minister Misael Pastrana against former general and (peaceful) dictator[1] Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.  Into the night, Rojas was leading in the vote count until the Interior Minister ordered radio stations to stop broadcasting partial results.  By morning, several regional voting stations had issued corrected results and Pastrana was declared the winner.

Thus was born the M-19, the most famous left-wing guerilla movement of the 1970s and 1980s.  As one of his founders later remarked, “if the General couldn’t get a fair election, there was no point for us to go on fighting in the political arena”.

Two decades before, the 1948 assassination of Liberal leader and presidential candidate Eliecer Gaetán, a populist “progressive” albeit anti-communist, had triggered a civil war ultimately resolved by the coming to power of General Rojas Pinilla.

Frustrating voters’ aspirations or manipulating elections often leads to upheavals, regardless of culture or geography.

The April Revolution of 1960 overthrew South Korean President Syngman Rhee when people realized that he denied them alternatives and had falsified the results of the vice-presidential elections. 

Similar uprisings or revolutions occurred in the Philippines (1986), Bahrain (1994), Indonesia (1998), Ukraine (2004), Ivory Coast (2010) among others.

Which brings us to France, a country of great sophistication with a penchant for sudden popular outbursts.

Politicians, jurists and journalists’ arguments notwithstanding, it is a fact that, today, French voters are effectively “denied” a vote for political change.  Current presidential candidates include:  Jean-Luc Melenchon (far left, admirer of Hugo Chavez), Benoit Hamon (left of socialist President Hollande who kicked him out of his cabinet), Emanuel Macron (former Minister of Finance in Hollande cabinet, probably center-left), François Fillon (former Prime Minister of President Sarkozy, center-right/right) and Marine Le Pen (president of the National Front, right/far-right).

No sooner was Fillon leading the polls that he was the subject of an anonymous attack in the press about remuneration that his wife had received to serve as his assistant in Parliament.  The dossier was well researched and presented him in the worst possible light.  A panel of three judges was formed to investigate whether or not any abuse had taken place. While it doesn’t look good to employ your wife, and for a while your children, it doesn’t seem that he committed any crime or abuse given the statutes that apply to the funding of congressmen staff in France.  Nevertheless, he dropped precipitously in the polls and has been fighting for his political life ever since.

Marine Le Pen, who was shown as winning the first round of the voting, was also the target of attacks from Brussels for similar issues (employment of assistants) and from French justice regarding campaign financing and other matters.  But unlike Fillon, she has refused to appear in front of the judges, alleging interference with her campaign.

No other candidate has been targeted, only those right-of-center.  The likely calculation of the attackers is that Fillon will not make it to the second voting round (since no one is expected to win over 50% in the first round), setting a Macron-Le Pen contest with Macron winning it.

Such a second round field would be damaging for France as Fillon is the only candidate with an honest diagnosis of what ails France, and both a plan and the will to engineer a recovery.  Le Pen’s economic program is unrealistic, while Macron’s is so timid as to have little impact over a 5 year mandate.

However, the attacks on Fillon could also backfire on the plotters.  While Le Pen and her National Front are described as extreme right, they are, in reality, very populist and nationalist.  And while many of Fillon’s voters approve of conservative economic policies, they are energized by issues such as immigration and regaining sovereignty from Brussels; to them, Macron’s economic program is marginally more attractive, but Le Pen’s nationalism is a bigger draw.  Add to that the spite that their candidate was torpedoed by the left and Le Pen could become a real magnet for Fillon's base.

The election of Donald Trump, and its aftermath, is often presented as what France (and its neighbors) could expect in case of a Le Pen victory.  I think it would be worse.  France is much more centralized than the US, it is deeply enmeshed in the eurozone and the European Union, its society is less harmonious, and its economy is more fragile.  Finally, there is its culture, which produced three revolutions: 1789, 1848 and May 1968.

Countries only make the painful changes that they need after touching bottom, not before.  France has drifted downward for a long time, but it hasn’t touched bottom yet.  However, manipulated elections gone awry could push it down hard and trigger, not change, but chaos.

There is still the possibility that Fillon will win and gradually get France back on the upswing,

Or that Macron will win, ushering an era of stagnation and rising frustration and division,

There is also a chance that Le Pen wins, installing a forceful president with only 2 seats out of 577 in the National Assembly, little hope of building a governing coalition or attracting first class cabinet candidates, and a dangerous economic agenda.

Three possible election outcomes, and I don’t know what probability to attribute each one of them.




[1]Rojas Pinilla was an unusual dictator in that he was put into the job by both Conservative and Liberal parties to bring an end to their bloody fighting and reestablish peace.

Friday, December 19, 2014

Ce qui est bon pour la “goose” est bon pour le “gander”


Mafalda[1]

 
Over the last few weeks, a scandal without precedent has been engulfing Brazil.  I am referring to the so called petrolão at the center of which stands Petrobras.

Several years ago, a large vote buying scheme, the so called mensalão, threatened to bring down the Lula government.  But as a top Brazilian jurist noted recently, the mensalão amounted in total to R$170 million (US$65 million) while just one Petrobras executive is being asked to return R$250 million (US$95 million) in skimmed money.

The petrolão not only involved corrupt executives pocketing huge amounts of money but a well organized conspiration aimed at channeling 2% to 3% of the value of large investment contracts to the political parties in power, the PT, PMDB and PP.  Whether all the monies received by these parties were used for political purposes or partly appropriated by individuals remains to be seen. 

This couldn’t have worked without the complicity of the country top engineering and construction firms.  The inquiry into the petrolão soon unveiled the anti-competitive practices of these firms as they colluded to raise the value of contracts and take turns in winning them.

As Petrobras executives and their acolytes were offered reduced sentences for their cooperation, it came to light that the same corrupt practices extended to capital intensive sectors controlled by the state such as electric generation and railways.

Clearly, the most serious issue for Brazil is that its economic model has turned out to be fraught with inefficiencies, waste and corruption.  Since the extent of this scandal is yet to be determined, I will stick to Petrobras.

For many years, Petrobras was the cash cow of the state.  It was not unusual for it to make investments which were not the best use of its capital; it often “deworsifed” in fields where it didn’t have a particular expertise; more than one politician or ex-government official got his pension, or part of it, paid or complemented by Petrobras.

To get it into shape, President F. H. Cardoso partially privatized Petrobras in 2000[2].  He succeeded in the face of huge opposition, particularly from the PT and its leader, Mr. Lula da Silva.  The Cardoso administration even considered changing the company name to Petrobrax to dramatize the hoped for break with the past.

And for several years, it worked.  Thanks to its technical expertise and tighter management, the company made major offshore discoveries and achieved a good level of profitability.  These discoveries were made even more valuable by the global commodity boom.

The prospects of a highly profitable Petrobras, while welcome by minority shareholders didn’t go down well with President Lula; he publicly lamented that so much of Petrobras money was distributed to foreigners in the form of dividends.  Before the end of his second mandate, his government engineered a highly controversial capital increase, the purpose of which being to increase government control over the company.  Ironically, despite the bad press this operation received, the government didn’t succeed in gaining a two thirds majority of the voting common share capital.

Greater control over the company, both at the corporate level and via new offshore oil and gas legislation proved disastrous.  Petrobras was saddled with huge investment obligations which were beyond its financing and management capacities.  As a result, it embarked on a massive debt raising program while consistently missing its production commitments[3].  The new legislation also took away Petrobras’ ability to prioritize its offshore investments, giving that authority to a newly formed government agency.

Over the last years, global liquidity, rock-bottom interest rates and high oil prices let Petrobras borrow huge sums of money, and that pactole attracted the attention of many: as the French humorist Sasha Guitry once said, “I can resist everything except temptation”. The old practice of placing well connected people within the Petrobras hierarchy took a more ominous turn: as top executive positions - division heads – were allocated among the various political parties within the government coalition, it was just a (very) small step to use this connection to siphon money out.

The solution to this catastrophic situation is to privatize Petrobras, the French way.

Manolito may think he can’t speak French, but when it come to economic culture and policy, translating French into Brazilian Portuguese is very easy.

I have always been impressed by how France and Brazil converged in that regard: both countries have a strong centralized government and administration, large public sectors, share a vision of economic dirigisme[4] mixing interference with subsidized financing; finally, both like to nurture national champions.

Now, both know that politics and national oil champions shouldn’t mix. 

For many years, Elf Aquitaine was the French national oil champion, and that brought it rewards, such as the award of foreign oil concessions. In the early 1990s, it was very close to the government and often played an active role in French foreign policy in the Middle East and Africa.  In part, this was due to its history as Elf was born from the merger of two government agencies[5].  By comparison, the second largest oil company, Cie Française des Pétroles (later renamed Total) played second fiddle; Total was also run by a no-nonsense CEO who knew how to keep some distance with the French government. 

In 1994, all hell broke loose, when the press revealed that billions of dollars had been siphoned from Elf and spent on payments to African, European and French politicians as well as executive “perks”.  The story ended badly for Elf.  Its executives were brought to court and jailed, and it was absorbed by Total in 2000. 

Brazilians will immediately see a pattern here.

Mindful of the dangers of letting politicians too close to very rich companies, Total was privatized in a way which could and should apply to Petrobras.  The basic idea was that the company would be run as a major publicly held company by professional managers not state appointees.  To that end, the state would sell its majority stake down.  At the same time, steps would be taken to ensure that it would remain an effective national champion.

The initial step was to assemble a nucleus of stable, long term French institutional investors.  In the case of Petrobras, these institutions exist and include major pension funds, large banks and insurance companies.  They could hold 10% to 15% of the common shares[6].  The government would retain a large minority ownership and the balance of the shares would be allocated to retail and institutions both domestic and foreign.

The second step entails the state selling most of his shares in the company but retaining a golden share to veto such major decisions as change of control, bankruptcy or the sale of entire divisions such as refining, exploration, etc.  Total went public in 1991 with the French government holding a 30% stake.  That stake was gradually reduced to 1% by 1996.

Golden shares were declared illegal by European courts in 2003.  But there is little risk of a similar ruling in Brazil.  Indeed, given Brazilian politics and sensitivities, and the size of the financial commitments, I think that a golden share is necessary to facilitate a true privatization.  

It would be a monumental fight, but given the staggering and pervasive degree of corruption within the company and the threat to democracy that control of Petrobras clearly entails, a real privatization of Petrobras is not only feasible but crucial.

Ask any international oil company, it will tell you that Total is still very much the French national champion, that in large international project tenders, it enjoys the full backing and lobbying of the French administration.  But it is professionally run and Division Heads are not allocated among the Socialist, Green or other political party.

Little translation from French to Portuguese is needed; if the French can do it, so can the Brazilian.


[1] - Manolito, did you know that my mother was a French translator?  I know French too; I know how to say “Papa” in French.
  - Really? OK, how do you say it?
  - Papa.
  - Ah, that’s easy, it’s the same.
  - Easy? The same?  No way, the trick is to think in French! Try to say “Papa” but thinking it in French! Go ahead! Let’s see? Go ahead!
  - It’s useless! I’ll never be able to speak that damn language.
[2]  However, he couldn’t overcome broad resistance to an effective privatization with the state losing control over the company.
[3]  In fairness, a Lula inspired policy raising local content for heavy  offshore equipment and machinery contributed to Petrobras’ delays and cost overruns.
[4]  Faith in government economic development planning, and generally a “government knows best” belief.
[5]  The Régie Autonome des Pétroles and the Société Nationale des Pétroles d’Aquitaine.
[6]   This percentage is suggested given the huge size of Petrobras and the likelihood that a true privatization would make it much more valuable.

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

2102 revisited: the weight of culture and the risks of destabilization


In my post of last January, I quoted excerpts from a 1932 article that journalist Paul Scheffer wrote for the Berliner Tageblatt.  It painted an audience’s expectation and attitude ahead of a speech by Adolf Hitler.  What struck Scheffer was that most of these people were what he called ‘de-classed” middle-class, that is, people who had lost both their standard of living and their self-esteem, and who were waiting for a miracle.  My conclusion was that, as momentous as the impact of the current crisis had been on European economies, it would hit politics even harder.  I argued that the explosive development of social media would be a key contributing factor.  I stand by this assessment.

Subjected to an abrupt increase in unemployment, taxes and cuts in social benefits, Europeans are looking for miracles, and this situation provides fertile ground for demagogues and extremists.  In Greece, Holland and Hungary, we have seen the rise of extreme-right movements; in Spain we have seen the rise of leftwing, nationalist parties.  In France, while a moderate socialist won the presidency, there has been an unprecedented fragmentation of the political scene: splinter groups on the Left led by the likes of Mssrs. Mélanchon and Montebourg are increasingly at odds with the government as are the Greens; on the right, the UMP is splitting as it cannot decide if it should follow a centrist but unimaginative path or one of assertive populism.  In Italy, the anti-establishment party of Beppe Grillo is the second most popular political party and center parties have receded the most.  As the fortunes of Europe are unlikely to brighten any time soon, I expect an increase in centrifugal forces.

Faced with mounting pressure from the markets, most governments delayed taking corrective measures, giving the unfortunate impression that, in the end, they succumbed to outside pressure.  This in turn contributed to weakening them and the prospects for a consensual EU solution.

The need to tap outside rescue programs also contributed to reviving long standing regional frictions, witness the North-South divide in Italy, Catalonia and the Basque region in Spain and Scottish independence in the UK.

If, as I believe, the European economies do not rapidly improve, I expect that the above mentioned stresses will increase.  At first, populism is likely to rise; after all, it is easier to deflect popular anger towards the rich or large corporations (witness the 75% tax or the skirmishes with Peugeot and Arcelor-Mittal), but as these do not have bottomless pockets and are more mobile than the rest, new tactics will be needed.  The temptation for governments to intervene ever more deeply into the economy may become irresistible.  This would buy peace for a while, but it will also bring the center of gravity of politics into a no-man’s land: no longer liberal democracy, not yet illiberal democracy.  One can think of Argentina and Venezuela as the ultimate “models” for such a drift.

Pervading this debate is the unrecognized influence of culture, a major interest of mine, and something I touched upon in my post of last March.  It is an issue that most commentators avoid as they view it as politically incorrect.  That may be so, but it doesn’t mean that it is irrelevant.

Culture is the glue that keeps groups of people together and in relative harmony.  Think of the IBM or the Marine Corps cultures.  It is also what defines nations, and so, by essence, it changes very, very slowly.  Why would we still read about Tocqueville’s America or Custine’s Russia otherwise? 

In the context of the current crisis, it is worth noting that there is a longing for but not a strong European culture; rather, there is the appearance of one when dealing with other very large nations such as China or the USA.  There are however very strong national cultures in Europe; these have had a significant impact on the management of the Debt Crisis so far, and I believe they will be play a major role in determining the survivors.

A great divide has been the so-called Recovery-Through-Growth proposition, i.e., that countries should first seek accommodating monetary and fiscal policies to overcome the current crisis, postponing tax increases and spending cuts for later.  President Hollande has been its most vocal advocate.  The other side of the proposition is No-Pain-No-Gain, which is that the bitter medicine won’t taste sweeter next year and problems are best tackled early before they snowball.

It is interesting to note that France and Hungary are in the first camp while Ireland, Portugal, the UK and Germany are in the second[1].  Spain and particularly Italy are in the middle, leaning perhaps towards the latter group.  Ireland is showing progress; Portugal is still struggling but is in a much better shape than Greece.  The UK was widely criticized for choosing austerity and indeed paid the price with a slight contraction in GDP.  What is remarkable is that these countries chose to endure sacrifice – quite big in the case of Ireland and Portugal - yet their populations didn’t rebel.  They may have paid a higher price in terms of GDP loss than others, but they will come out of the crisis faster.

Italy, led by its Northerners, also took the path of some reforms, although this may not be enough to avoid debt restructuring.  There is no clear prospect for a majority government next year.  As for Spain, it finally seems to have accepted the need for its intervened banks to face reality (merger for some, assumption of losses by creditors and shareholders).  Its government is trying to take unpopular measures but it enjoys spotty popular support and it must deal with internal regional issues.  As to France, and as I noted in previous posts, it is so rich as to being able to delay the day of reckoning.  At the same time, it suffers from an ill shared with others – the weakening of its political center – as well as home-grown cultural idiosyncrasies – such as the inability to do evolution when revolution is an alternative.

To my mind, national culture had a lot to do with the choices nations have made and it will have a lot to do with the outcome(s) of the current European crisis.  This is particularly so since unemployment is expected to rise and economic activity is projected to be lackluster in 2013: national cohesion and resilience will thus be painfully tested.

In sum, while economic progress has been made in Europe, more hardship is on the way.  This in turn will put further stress on political systems which already show signs of fragmentation and polarization.  Politics rather than economics will likely determine the outcome of the current debt crisis.  So will national cultures; they help explain the choices that countries have made and they will play a major role in mapping the future outline of Europe.

 



[1]  Germany is not (yet) in crisis but it did take some pain under Chancellor Schroeder.

Thursday, November 8, 2012

The Gallois Report



One learns from experience at any age.  Look at me.  Having calculated that the odds of two consecutive once-in-a-century mega-storms were close to zero, I declined to purchase a standby generator.  Wrong.  The generator guy is coming by tomorrow.

In France and the US, politicians have become experts at kicking the can down the road, until they hit a wall and need to come up with Plan B.  In this country, we had the Simpson-Bowles Commission; its report was quickly buried but, within the next twelve months, it will likely resurface as the US margin of maneuver is squeezed and public finances are in dire need of fixing.  If our politicians succeed, they should send their French brethren a copy of their recipe, because France could learn from it.

Likewise, France commissioned a report on industrial competitivess from Louis Gallois, one of its most prominent grand patrons[1].  Mr. Gallois just delivered it today.  Having lamented the decline of the US industry, our politicians would do well to read his report, for even if our problems are not quite the same as the French, there is enough commonality to make it required reading.  The diagnostic of the French industry’s weaknesses and falling from grace is particularly instructive, because we could be next on that slippery slope. 

Generally, Mr. Gallois recommends a “competitiveness shock” where key measures are applied quickly rather than being diluted over a decade.  He also stresses that French society must debate the reforms and come together on a plan which will carry the conviction that sacrifices and benefits will be fairly shared.  Indeed, the plan is as much about mutual confidence as it is about specific measures.  

Such convergence of efforts and ultimate rewards (you think of Reagan’s motto “trust but verify”) calls for lower social charges for both employers and employees (1.5% of GDP), greater participation of employees and union representatives in the policy deliberations of large corporations and a robust support for small and medium-sized companies.

Although Mr. Gallois is reputed to be left-leaning, he sees a key contribution of the state as doing no harm.  In his view, any significant new law or governmental decree should be accompanied by a document estimating its impact on industrial competitiveness, and recommendations as to reduce adverse consequences, if any.  The state should also refrain from changing key provisions that affect such areas as R&D investment tax credit, incentives affecting the formation of new companies, among others.  But in typical French manner, the ghost of Five Year Plans of yore would return in the much milder guise of Commissariat à la Prospective.

There are twenty two recommendations made in the report, ranging from broadening and codifying employee participation on corporate boards to ways of fostering innovation, rewarding long term portfolio investors, developing shale gas resources, etc.  Many of these recommendations should be studied in this country because we could benefit from them.

On a higher level, the Report is daunting.  It calls on the government to reduce public spending and it aims at reshaping the French industrial fabric: creating more mid-size companies (think of the German Mittelstand model) and pushing the sector up market where higher quality products permit higher profit margins (think LVMH, Sanofi- Aventis and, I wish, Delage and Delahaye instead of dreary Peugeot).  That is a very tall order, hence the deliberate step-by-22 steps approach.

Equally instructive, and courageous, is Gallois’ call to stimulate capital investment in industry, which in turns necessitates toning down overregulation and the demonization of executives.  This capitalization drive also requires greater stability in the relations with stakeholders which Gallois hopes to achieve by (1) offering greater employee participation in corporate decisions (up to four but in any case less than 1/3 of the board of director seats at companies with over 5,000 employees) and (2) stronger voice for long term shareholders (doubling of their votes after two years).

The initial French government reaction was typical: countering Gallois’ 22 recommendations with 35 proposals, yet watering and complicating the proposed key reduction in social charges.  As the Shadoks[2] of my youth used to say, GA BU ZO MEU, why make it simple if you can make it complicated.

France like the US is faced with mounting pressure to reform itself, yet neither country is on the cusp of the abyss.  Their respective governments have been divisive so that there is no popular consensus on the necessary reforms and shared sacrifices. Yet well connected outsiders (Gallois, Bowles, Simpson) have started to speak up.  In the days of instant communication and interconnected economies we should and need to pick what they have to say, wherever they may be domiciled.



[1]   Louis Gallois is a former CEO of Airbus, EADS, SNCF.
[2]  A popular and off-beat French TV series in the 1960s.

Friday, October 19, 2012

Revisiting privatizations


Over the course of last year and this year, I have advocated that European countries facing excessive indebtedness and sub-par growth should consider selling public assets.  In the case of Greece, I noted in 2011 that ex-ECB board member, Juergen Stark, had estimated Greek public assets available for sale at around €300 billion; this was to be compared with a national GDP of €240 billion and an overall sovereign debt of €320 billion.

I also advocated the same course of action for others, such as Italy, Spain and France.  The benefits of such a policy would be to increase overall economic efficiency and to raise funds to reduce national debt.  It could also help develop a large and stable pool of savings for future retirees.

I also noted that the best example of what this policy could yield was the Chilean experience in the 1980s.  This is one in which I was closely involved as a banker and investor.  Back then, Chile received no outside financial help, in stark contrast to the current European situation.  Yet, thanks to well conceived debt-to-equity and debt prepayment programs, it managed to reduce its external commercial debt by one third without alienating international markets.

Therefore I was happy to read an interview of Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim in which he too advocated the sale of public assets as a necessary although not sufficient condition to get European economies back on track.

Countries are often reluctant to part with public assets, for very human reasons:

1.      Bureaucrats will lose a sinecure and a power base while employees may see their benefits cut back and even be terminated;

2.      Selling assets during a crisis is bound to bring less than optimal prices;

3.      Deep pocketed foreigners will take advantage of their momentary weakness to take control of national assets;

4.      Public services, once privatized, will be rationalized, resulting in higher tariffs and smaller geographic coverage.

 Indeed, reducing bureaucracy is one of the benefits of privatization.  In many instances, public employee benefits are far more generous than those accruing in the private sector, and the difference represents a subsidy which is unfairly borne by the latter and should be eliminated.  Privatizations often result in job cuts, but the resulting hardship can be controlled and reduced with compensatory and retraining policies and by the opening of new private job opportunities in a resurgent economy.

It is obvious that, at least in the beginning, public assets will be sold at depressed prices, but getting optimum prices is not the name of the game, putting the economy back on track is.  Besides, the cost of a weak economy with a depressed job market is far higher than the money left on the table, so to speak, by selling assets early.  And experience in Brazil and Chile has shown that, if privatizations are accompanied by sound fiscal and economic policies, markets soon adjust and subsequent asset sales command higher prices.

Rich multinationals or vulture funds are often the bugaboos that discourage countries from privatizing.  The reality is that it all depends on how privatizations are structured.  In Chile, most privatizated companies were bought by local entities, sometimes operators, sometimes financiers, sometimes by consortia which included local pension funds; in the case of the largest privatizations, special financing was made available so that local households could buy into blocks of shares that had been reserved for them (the so called capitalismo popular).  In Mexico, it is worth remembering that the largest privatization was won by a consortium of Mexican, American and French interests led by Mr. Carlos Slim who retained effective control.  I might also add that, in my experience, foreigners who have bought local companies on the cheap in times of great national stress end up paying a fair price over time, as governments find ways to extract more money or consideration from them.   One can only look at the electric utility sector in Brazil where the current government is trying to force through a new tariff regimen.

One large and apolitical source of funds to tap in order privatize public assets would be national pension funds.  These were instrumental in similar projects in Latin America and some Nordic countries.  Unfortunately, countries such as France, Italy and Spain largely rely on pay-as-you-go pension schemes, and their pension funds control very small pools of funds (0.2%, 4.6% and 7.9% of GDP respectively).   By contrast, pension funds in countries such as Chile (67%), Finland (82%) and the Netherlands (135%) are much larger and offer far more strategic flexibility.  It would be highly controversial in France in particular, but just imagine if it had a pension pool of 1 trillion euros!  If Italy had €900 billions and Spain €600 billion!  Such funds would dwarf the much maligned hedge funds and vulture investors; they would also match their long term investment horizons with the government desire to find stable institutional investors.

Finally, there is the fear that privatized public services will no longer serve the public, or that tariffs will be raised too high.  With sound regulations, the former concern can be allayed.  The real question is whether essential services should be subsidized, and if so how, or not.  If a country decides that the provider of such services should subsidize them, then privatization may not be appropriate.  Witness the continuing frictions between Telmex and the Mexican government on this issue, or worse, the case of the energy sector in Argentina or even EDF in France.  Countries can’t have it both ways: they can’t privatize and then control prices.  Ultimately though, tariffs may initially increase and then gradually decrease as most of the efficiency gains are passed on to customers.

The current debate in Europe has little chance of bringing about a workable solution to the prevailing financial and fiscal problems:  drastic austerity, be it via spending cuts or tax increases, cannot work because it is socially and politically unacceptable; fast growth is unrealistic because, in the absence of other measures, it is equivalent to Northern member countries subsidizing their Southern fellow members and cosigning their debts.

Austerity is necessary, but its focus should be a combination of shrinking the public sector and making the economy more efficient.  Privatizing public enterprises should be the key driver of this effort.

Growth based on EU subsidies and wealth transfers is a non starter; but growth based on a leaner, more flexible private sector is possible and sustainable.  Indeed, examples of this are easy to find in recent history.  Part of the privatizations proceeds should be earmarked to retrain downsized employees and to help them bridge a conversion period leading to new jobs in the private sector.

Finally, privatizations are essential to reduce sovereign debts in a manner which doesn’t disrupt markets, encourages new investments and keeps financing costs affordable.

At the end of the day, return to fundamental financial equilibrium and economic growth is possible but no single silver bullet exists that will do it all.  Rather, European democracies will need to find a workable balance of some austerity, some tax increases, gains in efficiency and delayed but better quality growth.  To that end, a broad privatization program is essential to help achieve many of these goals in a sustainable and socially acceptable way.  It would also provide the opportunity to establish a modern and potent retirement pension fund industry.

Thursday, September 20, 2012

May 29, 2024


The police presence was heavy as usual, but the oppressive, volatile atmosphere that had cast a pall over the Champs Elysées, and indeed the whole city in previous weeks, had lifted.  Instead, an air of expectancy mixed with curiosity had gradually set among the assembled multitude.  But the police prefect was taking no chance, as dozens of armored transports and riot control vehicles were massed, out of sight, on the rue de Ponthieu and Avenue Kleber.

 “I wonder if he will bring his kids” wondered a thin man in a bright yellow Tshirt.  “Carla will not let him!” shot back his neighbor, “Besides, they don’t speak French so they wouldn’t understand what’s going on” added another.  “Well, is he coming or what, we’ve been waiting since four o’clock!” complained a neatly dressed middle aged woman.

HE had been waiting for an even longer time, twelve years to be exact.  He had lost the 2012 elections more than his adversary had won them.  The French had rejected an hyperactive President in favor of a calmer, blander alternative; they had turned their back on “a certain idea of France” and voted in favor of a more comfortable, traditional vision that had much in common with that of an ostrich in imminent danger.  In truth, HE had not helped his case: during most of his term, his unbound energy notwithstanding, he had rarely given a sense of what his governing priorities were or should be, and during the presidential campaign, he had shied away from focusing on the challenges and policy choices that faced the nation.

Hated by many, radioactive to his fellow UMP members, Nicolas Sarkozy had accepted a fellowship at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.  Within a few years, he had added a teaching position at the university’s Political Science Department and become involved with Stanford’s famed Business School.  In 2018, the IPO of  Uwin, in which he had invested $200,000, made him the first billionaire ex-President.  He was half way through his traversée du desert[1].  Now a very wealthy man, and the symbol of the modern politician who reinvented himself successfully if unconventionally, Nicolas Sarkozy would spend another six years trying to reenter the French political scene. 

Far from the Californian shores, France was not doing so well.  Neither the new president nor the French felt like paring the budget.  Having promised his electors economic growth rather than public spending cuts, President Hollande found it difficult to backtrack, even when faced with a budget deficit bigger than expected.  Taxes on the rich were raised yet they brought in but a fraction of the needed revenues.  So fiscal policy was relaxed, deficit targets were postponed and pressure mounted on the ECB and Northern Europe to provide additional deficit financing.

Had France been isolated, it may have been forced to face the music, but it was not alone; Spain and Italy were in the same situation, having to push through austerity measures which were increasingly unpopular and politically explosive. 

On the other hand, Germany, already facing slowing economic growth and the fallout from China’s recession, was growing more and more concerned that its financial commitments vis-à-vis the eurozone were becoming so large as to be internally destabilizing.  Netherlands, Finland and Austria were on the same page, and in any case too small to shoulder a greater eurozone assistance program.

This all came to a head at the Antwerp conference of 2014.  The new Spanish prime minister, who had just spent two weeks battling with the regional governments of Catalonia, Andalusia and Murcia, announced that he was neither in a position to accept more outside supervision from the troika nor to pay the sovereign debt as scheduled.  His Italian homologue noted that his new coalition in Congress wished to revisit some of the reforms voted under the Mario Monti government and that, in any case, the Spanish crisis made it impossible for Italy to access the financial markets on sustainable terms.  France for its part had been under a three weeks general strike which had escaped the control of the two dominant unions, the CGT and the CFDT, and leftwing splinter parties under the leadership of Jean-Luc Mélenchon were calling for the nationalization of half of the companies in the CAC 40 index.  President Hollande had to decide which way to go.  In the end, he calculated that he couldn’t win over the strikers or the opposing political parties because they would never accept the necessary remedies which, in any case, he didn’t himself fully embrace.  He also felt that the country was far richer than generally acknowledged and could take care of its own financial problems if these were, at least partially, reduced.

On October 15, 2014 in Antwerp, Germany, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands formed the New Eurozone, anchored by the Euromark(€Mk).  Central banks’ balances with the ECB were to be settled via new 10 year ECB bonds.  Given the instant 30% appreciation of the €Mk vs. the €, Germany took an immediate mark-to-market loss of some €200 billion on its ECB credits.  On the other hand, it also showed a comparable gain on its outstanding sovereign debt for the opposite reason.  The top French, Italian and Spanish banks were nationalized.

In the months and year that followed this historical event, it became clear that Anwerp solved only in small part an economic problem, but was even less successful dealing with political challenges.

The German economy took a hit, but not as hard as some had feared.  The €Mk proved a serious headwind to exports and corporate profits, as German exporters cut their margins to the bone to preserve market share.  Imports by France, which represented 19% of total, plunged.  On the other hand, parts and other imports from France, Northern Italy and Spain rose.  Corporate efficiency campaigns went into high gear to mitigate the pricing headwind of a strong currency.  Endowed with a super strong €Mk, German companies accelerated new capital investments in Asia, Mexico and the US.  By the end of 2017, the German economy had regained it mojo, and the timely Chinese recovery proved an added bonus.

In France, the competitive boost gained from a weaker euro was transitory.  It weakened the case for deeper reforms.  It depressed consumption and therefore tax revenues.  Faced with a diminished purchasing power and depreciated savings, the population soon became restless and clamored for “a new deal”.  But faced with high borrowing costs, the government had limited resources.  So, in 2015, new taxes were levied on those who profited from the devaluation, mainly exporters and international firms.  Next, private savings were channeled to finance what amounted to general budgetary shortfalls.  As this was not sufficient, the government reached farther for new sources of funding.  In 2017, “Social Solidarity Financing Programs”, or PROFINSS, were started whereby public assets, services or institutions were used to collateralize new public debt issues.

The state of affairs was not very different in Italy and Spain.  In particular, social and political unrest had become pervasive in Spain where the central government was still faced with a volatile conflict with the regions.  For the first time in recent memory, Italy was faced with its own kind of regional strife, as Northern Italy was in open conflict with Rome.

With stagnant economies and restive populations, these three countries pressed the ECB to increase its emission of money, trying to compensate some of the adverse effects of this policy with export incentives and targeted compensatory schemes.  By 2020, most French salaries included indexation provisions and inflation had risen to 7% p.a.  At the same time, price controls had been expanded, so that the official consumer price index was widely viewed as understating inflation by several hundred points.

As we have seen the Antwerp conference and its aftermath had brought France little relief.  The 2017 presidential elections were hotly contested but the right lost handily, divided as it had always had been.  President Hollande also lost, to his minister Arnaud Montebourg.  The new president was viewed as more charismatic and “progressive” yet not as extreme as Mélenchon. Yet Mélenchon and his Left Party scored big at the legislative elections and assured their participation in the new government.  Also scoring big was the National Front of Marine Le Pen with the support of some refugees from the UMP.

By the time the 2022 elections came around, the world economy had mostly recovered from its slump of a decade before.  China was in the midst of its Domestic Frontier program aimed at accelerating the development of its Western provinces.  Mexico had become the latest emerging markets star and the leader of a revitalized Latin American free trade group which included Chile, Peru, Colombia and a reborn Venezuela whose oil production had reached 4 million barrels per day thanks to the historic opening of its energy sector to private companies.   The US too was on the mend, having flirted twice with disaster but finally built a block of moderates from both parties in the House.

Southern Europe lagged behind.  In France, the 2022 had brought a new president, former Socialist Party Secretary Martine Aubry in the same role of conciliator as that thrown upon Montebourg five years earlier.  The opposition was led by Marine Le Pen as the leader of the Union pour un Movement Républicain-UMR, the result of the fusion of the UMP and the National Front.

By then, the Socialists and the UMR parties had hardened their positions, as each firmly believed that it could impose its views, bloc the other and win over the support of the population thanks to massive demonstrations or other spectacular action.  Crime had become a major social issue and how to combat it was a key political battle ground; the CGT and CFDT unions backed the government while the police unions supported the more vigorous policies advocated by the opposition.  Over the next two years, the policy stalemate continued and pressure built.

In 2024, with little economic growth, continued capital flight and persistent inflation despite administrative price controls, the government took the fateful decision to nationalize what it called the Six Strategic Pillars of the economy: Electricité de France, France Telecom, Lafarge, Renault, Suez and Total.  The government had expected that this move would not be overly disruptive; after all, the Paris stock market had been in a state of torpor for years, all six stocks traded at already depressed levels and state intervention in their affairs was already pervasive.

Market and popular reaction was however wholly unexpected.  While many had not minded the state controlling prices and browbeating wealthy executives, they were now aghast that the attack was directed at their own property.  Also, while stock prices had been depressed for a long time, dividend yields were attractive as they approximated official inflation levels.  Finally, the nationalization raid had come out of the blue and nobody knew what else was in the offing.  On the far left, politicians were up in arm when the prime minister announced that compensation would be paid “based” on market prices; why should taxpayers money be used to reward those who had unjustly profited at the expense of the working class?  Institutional investors, for their part, wondered whether they should wait or just dump all their holdings.

On that day of May 21, 2024 the already depressed CAC 40 dropped by 27% before trading was halted.  International suppliers made it clear that they would suspend all non-essential dealing with the Six Pillars until further notice.  S&P, Moody’s and Fitch downgraded the Six’s credit ratings by five notches triggering sharp drops in their bond prices.  French sovereign and other top corporate bonds swooned in unison.

On the morning of the 22nd, the Paris Stock Exchange didn’t open for trading and a €4 billion OAT issue was cancelled.  By noon, when trading finally opened, the CAC 40 fell another 11% whereupon the exchange was closed for the day.  Sporadic runs by depositors on branches of BNP, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale were reported in Lille, Strasbourg and Grenoble.

By the 23rd, the UMR had called on the government to explain its ill advised nationalization in Congress, with supporters and detractors engaging in shooting matches and government members occasionally ducking for cover as projectiles of various shape and weight flew across the Chamber.  Outside, civilians, union members, and employees of the Six were picketing, milling around and waiting for something to happen.

On the 26th, two things became crystal clear: (1) the government was going to fall, and (2) the UMR had zero chance to replace it.

And so, on the 29th of May, 2024, at approximately 6 pm, Nicolas Sarkozy, former president (2007-2012), former fellow of the Hoover Institution, venture capitalist extraordinaire, walked up the length of the Champs Elysées, accompanied by his wife Carla and his two daughters, and by the clamor of half a million French.  His hair was grey and his cheeks were rounder, but years of surfing in California had helped him stay in shape, and he effortlessly glided up the famed avenue. 

The government had resigned; President Aubry had asked Nicolas Sarkozy to form a new one.  She had also agreed to resign within three months so that new elections could be called.  Already, brand new banners, white and blue background with “France Avenir” in bold red letters, were fluttering in the breeze, portends of campaign soon to be launched.

The above is just an exercise in political fiction, although it attempts to find a realistic base in history and economic realities.  But it is only that.  Alternative scenario could have been proposed which would have a chance of happening.  The point of this fable is not to guess what the future will be like.  It is to illustrate as vividly as possible the fact that the latest debt and European crises have had severe economic consequences, yet relatively mild political ones. 

In our view, the next few years are likely to bring about political upheaval on a scale comparable with the economic upheaval we have been through so far.



[1]  Literally, crossing of the desert.