Showing posts with label Argentina debt crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Argentina debt crisis. Show all posts

Friday, August 1, 2014

Miles Gloriosus Redux

Ever since they have sat around a fire, or in comfortable candle-lit theaters, humans have enjoyed good comedies.  A recurring target of laughter has been he who indulged in hyperbole;  Plautus’ Miles Gloriosus, the Commedia dell’ Arte’s Matamoros and Theophile Gautier’s Capitaine Fracasse, one character for the ages.

For some reason, I was reminded of this transcendental “hero” when I read Argentina’s economy minister declare yesterday: “We are not going to sign any agreement that compromises the future of the Argentine people”[1].

Was the minister was referring to a demand made at gun point by a world power to grab the country’s oil and gas deposits or to blockade its grain exports lest it can set its own prices?  No, the minister was referring to his refusal to pay some $1.5billion of sovereign debt and interest thereon to investors[2] who refused to accept the “restructuring” terms imposed in 2004 by the Argentine government! 

Well, restructuring is perhaps misleading...  Before 2004, when countries were unable to repay their debts as originally agreed, they negotiated; that was in the interest of all parties.  The Brady bonds which were issued in 1990-1994 to restructure the debts of most Latin American sovereign debts[3] included an estimated forgiveness or “haircut” of 30% to 40%[4].  In 1998, Russia broke with tradition by insisting on a haircut of about 55%; there again, the eventual loss was much lower.

Argentina decided to go for a 75% haircut!  In my mind, that was tantamount to reneging on its obligations.  Why did they get away with it?  For two reasons: 1) Argentina’s was an isolated country default at the time rather than part of a wider regional or global meltdown, so that institutional creditors had more capacity to take losses, and 2) unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, Argentina’s debts were mostly in the form of bonds which were widely held - including famously by Italian pensioners - and traded; the creditors were thus in a weaker bargaining position.

Being traded at very low prices, some of these bonds were acquired by vulture funds which bet that, since under New York law, one party to a contract cannot amend it unilaterally, they stood a good chance to get paid.  It has taken them a decade, but they seem close to their goal.

Ironically, there has been much hand-wringing by states, money-center banks and even the IMF of all people, that the legal travails of Argentina are bad for the global financial system because they show that orderly restructurings are not feasible.  “Experts” have suggested including cram-down clauses[5] in the borrowing contracts; local “experts” have suggested that sovereign debtors borrow under their own laws so that they could amend them to suit their debt service ability (or willingness).

It is true that the investor base of emerging markets bonds is much broader than it was thirty years ago, making it more difficult to obtain unanimity in case contracts need to be amended.  But the application of New York law and the absence of cram-down clauses have also permitted emerging countries to borrow at very low rates.  If a debtor in difficulty proposes a rescheduling that matches its future capacity to pay, chances are that there should not be much room for arbitrage; and if some creditors opt out, they should represent a small enough percentage to be bought out.

A financial system allowing sovereign debtors to legally renege on their obligations by taking refuge behind their own laws or generous cram-down clauses cannot work: not for institutional traders (who couldn’t count on always finding willing buyers with whom to close their positions), not for investors (who would face too many unknowns to make long term commitments) nor for borrowers (who would have to pay much higher interest rates).

Finally, let us put Argentina’s cries (or bravado) in perspective: because of its defaults of 1983 and 2001, I don’t believe that Argentina has repaid any sovereign 10 year loan or bond issued between 1974 and now according to its original terms.

So the Argentine debt saga will go on for a while at least.  Over the last decade, its economy has continued to deteriorate, not just because the country couldn’t access international financial markets, but because its government practiced policies, from price fixing to expropriation and debt renegation, which discouraged investment from locals and foreigners alike and distorted the country’s economy and finances.

Nothing to brag about.




[1]   As reported by the Financial Times on 7/31/14.
[2]   Mostly Elliott Management Corp. after they had bought them from previous creditors.
[3]   Non Latin American countries also issued Brady bonds.
[4]   Estimated because it depended on the level of future US Treasury yields and Libor rates as the Bradies were priced off them.  In reality, as US interest rates dropped continuously in the 1990s and 2000s, the eventual loss to creditors  (if they had held on to the paper) was much less.
[5]   Such clauses would permit the debtor to force new repayment terms on its creditors provided they had been accepted by a minimum proportion of them (15% to 25%).

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Latin America in 2014: part III, fin de fiesta


Argentina

Cinephiles of a certain age may remember the 1960 film, Fin de Fiesta[1] by the Argentinean producer and director Leopoldo Torre Nilsson. I certainly do, for its powerful script and black and white cinematography.

Ostensibly set in the 1930s, the movie recounted the excesses of a provincial caudillo, his brutal and corrupt exercise of power and his downfall.  The fact that the film’s opening was marred by public disturbances showed that, for many, this was not a movie about an age long gone.

And why not, for it held a mirror to Argentine politics where the reprehensible practices of the pre-WWII governments were replicated by others of different stripes in the following decades, where corporatism flourished, tinged later by populism, and where moderates always failed to marginalize right-wing and left-wing radicals; Frondizi (1958-1962), Alfonsin (1983-1989) and Menem (1989-1999) come to mind in this regard.

Almost seven decades after its eponym was elected president, Peronism is again in power, alive if not all that well, in Argentina.  And as happened in the past, another fin de fiesta is in the offing.

Despite enormous natural riches, over the last decade Argentina has managed to put itself in an economic hole by following a populist ideology which has resulted in huge distortions of and burdens on its economy and finances.  It has alienated almost anyone with money to invest or consume: foreign creditors were rudely handled in a 2005 restructuring which looked more like spoliation; retirees saw their private pensions taken over by the government and used to plug budgetary holes and finance YPF; frozen energy tariffs threatened the financial health of a whole sector of the economy; Repsol, the controlling shareholder of YPF was initially expropriated without any compensation; statistical data bases, essential for the management of private business and finance were either tampered with, such as the inflation rate[2], or simply not kept up to date.

The results have been telling:  while it exported 20 million m³/day of natural gas to its neighbors in 2004 (one year into Nestor Kirchner’s presidency), in July 2013[3] Argentina imported 16.9 million m³/day from Bolivia and the equivalent of 27 million m³/day in LNG[4].  The picture is similar for oil: Argentina turned from being a net exporter of US$5.2 billion in 2004 to a net importer of US$3 billion in 2013[5]; these numbers understate the turn for the worse because 2004 oil prices were less than half of those in 2013.

As for electricity, by freezing utility rates in 2002, the government triggered high demand growth [6] while setting strong deterrents for investments in new generation[7].  It is also facing a mounting bill for rate subsidies which currently exceeds 3% of GDP for electricity and natural gas alone.  In short, the reality is: pressure on public finances and recurring blackouts in summer.

The erratic management of the economy and its finances has led to general underinvestment, the effects of which go well beyond the energy sector: a potentially high value-adding sector such as industry has been forced into retreat; the local automobile industry is now barely more than an assembly line where valuable components are imported from abroad.  The overall result is a rising need to increase imports when the country can least afford it, hence the never ending import tariffs, taxes and other restrictions to try and keep the trade balance in the black.

It is clear that the external situation of Argentina is unsustainable.  Official foreign exchange reserves stand at US$29 billion.  The IMF estimates that the country will suffer a cumulative current account deficit of US$29.1 billion over the next four years.  It cannot access international markets to raise debt financing.  Assuming that foreign direct investments were to remain flat at US$3 billion a year[8], this would leave Argentina with reserves of US$12 billion by year-end 2018, equivalent to a little over 2 months of imports.  Needless to say, a financial meltdown would occur well before that point.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the government decided to depreciate the peso by some 18% last week.  It is also hardly surprising that the government blamed speculators for its miseries.  While this move may provide some temporary respite, it will not be enough: the roots of the difficulties, excessive public spending, haven’t been dealt with, the government has little credibility and seems to improvise as it goes along[9].

In the end, these latest announcements show that the populist peronist economic model is reaching its limits.  The current government will likely be forced to make further policy adjustments to try and attract foreign money[10] and reduce public accounts imbalances; after coming to terms with Repsol in order to permit YPF to develop shale oil resources, Argentina is likely going to have to do the same with holders of its unrestructured foreign debt.  It will then need to make peace with exporters. 

Real reforms will need a government that enjoys more credibility and trust both at home and abroad.  That is for 2015/2016 perhaps, but the pendulum has started to swing back.  More and more, the priority of this government will be to reach 2015 without causing a massive economic and social breakdown.
 



[1]  Literally, the end of the party.
[2]  IMF issued a rare warning to Argentina for its poor handling of official statistics.
[3]  Up from 9.7 million m³/day a year earlier.  Bolivian gas imports are limited by pipeline capacity.  They are planned to increase to over 19 million m³/day shortly.  Current exports have plummeted to a few hundred thousands of cubic meters
[4]  Ource: Platts.
[5]  IMF projections.
[6]  CAMMESA, the wholesale market administrator, estimated in 2008 that, on average, electricity tariffs in Argentina were 1/3 of the Latin American average.
[7]  The government has made some tariff adjustments since then.
[8]  A puny number when compared to Colombia (US$15 billion, Mexico US$40 billion and Brazil US$50 billion).
[9]  A 20% surtax on the newly but limited purchases of dollars, was subsequently waived if these dollars were deposited at a bank for at least one year.  The much hyped possibility for individuals to buy dollars for savings purposes failed to convince as these dollars would have to remain in a bank account and Argentines remember what happened to their dollar accounts in 2001-2002 with the “corralito”.
[10]  Including dollars held abroad by Argentines.

Thursday, February 28, 2013

On a wing and a prayer


One of the most spectacular stages in certifying a jetliner is the wing load test.  Powerful hydraulic pistons subject the wing to ever increasing loads, bending it further upward.  Typically, it should break when the load is about 150% of its maximum expected value in flight.

Contrary to movie lore, where bolts start bursting and spars breaking, one after the other until the climatic end, the break in a wing load test is quite sudden, unpredictable with any degree of precision to the casual observer.  Yes, he will notice that stress is building as is the likelihood of a break, but the behavior of the wing at 151% will anticipate none of its destructive explosion at 152%.

Stress in society and politics tends to follow a similar pattern. In societies or countries experiencing very high financial or emotional stress, the observer can readily notice abnormal behaviors and worrisome signals, but nevertheless may conclude that train service will be more or less on time, that politicians will keep assembling and voting and people will follow more or less their usual routine.  Until, all of a sudden mayhem breaks out.

It is my belief that we are, so to speak, on a wing and a prayer in many parts of the world, certainly in Europe, and to some extent and sometimes for different reasons, in Latin America.  The extremely difficult question is whether the stress load is at 120%, 130% or 149%.

One country of concern to the investor, or should I say speculator, is Argentina.  Its economy continues to experience rising stress, its politics are poisonous and every day life is marred by the lack of security.  After the expropriation of Repsol, I decided to buy shares in YPF and Telecom Argentina (TEO) as they were very cheap and I expected the government to have to gradually return to more orthodox economic and financial policies to reach its development goals.  I also felt that international justice, while slow, was closing in.

I had thought that we were at 145% or so on the stress scale, but I now think while we may only be at 125%-130%, without an effective opposition we could go to 160% in a hurry.  Besides, the prices of these stocks had risen by 50% or so since we had bought them.  I decided to sell all of my YPF stocks and keep my TEO for the time being. 

The government seems unlikely to mend its ways and pressure to do so has not yet reached breaking point; its latest declaration in the US Appeals Court that it would not abide by its ruling if ordered to pay its debts may or may not be a ploy.  Furthermore, YPF seems to find it very difficult to implement the kind of joint ventures it needs to exploit its shale oil resources:  Exxon is MIA, Bridas may be a go but Chevron is mired in legal complications from an Ecuadorian lawsuit, and YPF’s CEO is seen courting second tier E&Ps around the globe. Even if these JVs start to operate, there is still a lot of risk attached to government meddling, as can be seen with Petrobras in Brazil.

Stress is building elsewhere too.  In Europe, with no currency devaluation possible and weak domestic and export markets, the fiscal adjustment must be borne by the population in the form of lower wages and benefits, a shrinking public sector and heavier taxation.  So far, there has been no statesman in a major country with the ability to push through any combination of these policies.  Monti tried and was bumped out; Hollande didn’t even try; Rajoy may do better than his two peers because of national cultural differences, but the jury is still out.

Are we at 110%, 120%, 130% in Western Europe?  Again, tough to say.  My guess is we are over 100% which really means that we are somewhat beyond the maximum “normal” stress level.  I think that stress is bound to rise for two reasons: either governments do too little and lose control over their autonomy or they try to do the right thing and will trigger massive pushback from pressure groups and maybe the population at large.  I still like companies in basic sectors which are effectively restructuring, such as retailers Carrefour in France and Tesco in the UK.  I also see strong restructuring talent at Vivendi (France).

As for the US, I am embarrassed by Washington, but I take solace in two factors: we are below 100% and there is a broader realization in the population that we need to cut government spending just like households cut their own.  The debate, in my view, will be how to devise a program that will be viewed as allocating the sacrifices fairly.

What is unclear is the margin of safety that we have as investors.  The actions of the Fed continue to distort all asset values, from real estate to bonds and stocks.  Traditional benchmarks such as p/e multiples, bond yields and the like imply that bonds are expensive and stocks are reasonably priced.  But with a slow growing economy and corporate profits at an historically high level, it doesn’t take much imagination to see stock prices falling 10% or even 20%.  So the important question is, should this happen, would the stocks that I hold still be attractively valued based on long-term fundamentals?  And since we are in a “what if” frame of mind, how about a Warren Buffett test that I find compelling:  would I hold the same stocks if I knew that their shares would not be publicly traded for the next three to five years?

Sunday, December 30, 2012

Götterdämmerung, versión criolla


Over the past decade, much of  South America has experienced a revival of socialism and populism.  Not surprisingly, this was accompanied by a longing for an idealized past and charismatic historical leaders.  The names and deeds of Perón, Bolivar and Castro were once again invoked by their heirs and called upon to repel foreign ideas and purported hegemonic designs.

In Brazil, after eight years of economic reforms and liberalization under President F. H. Cardoso, leaders from the PT (Ignacio Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff) were voted into power.  They gradually reversed course and increased government control over and intervention in the economy.  Petrobras, Vale do Rio Doce and the electric utility sector have been their main targets to-date.  The most apparent victims have been minority shareholders, but the companies themselves have paid a price.  Petrobras has kept missing its production targets while its debts have skyrocketed, tripling in four years when operating cashflows rose by just 10%[1].  By departing from precedent (if not the letter of the law), the government has made more difficult and expensive to upgrade and expand the electric utility sector.  The purpose of this interventionism was to lower energy costs thereby giving a boost to domestic industries and keeping inflation in check.  The same rationale has underpinned the active management of the currency.  But the unexpected consequences have  exceeded the sought after benefits.

As an apparent quid pro quo to their PT base for putting some limits on their economic activism, these two presidents have carried out foreign policies which have been mildly confrontational with the US and openly supportive of authoritarian regimes like Argentina, Venezuela and for a while Iran.  They wanted to reinforce Brazil’s influence over the rest of South America, and to that end, they tacitly endorsed policies and behaviors which would have caused strong protests had the US, not Brazil, been behind them.

In Argentina, President Nestor Kirchner, and upon his death his wife, Cristina Kirchner, have carried out populist economic policies (which have been extensively commented in this blog) while enjoying close kinship with the regime of President Chavez.  Their policies have failed, and the government has had to win over voters with subsidies and transfers of wealth from those who had some (foreign creditors, large companies, retirees) with little regard for effectiveness.  To a much greater extent than in Brazil, the rule of law has been consistently disregarded by the authorities.  The result has been a dearth of investment and a comparative drop in standard sof living, which in turn triggered more damage for the economy and society.

In Venezuela, President Chavez has seen himself as the heir to Fidel Castro and Simon Bolivar, borrowing his economic and political playbook from the former and promoting his regional aspirations after the latter.  Eager not to repeat Castro’s early mistakes, at first President Chavez was  careful to operate within the limits of the laws, although such restraint did not endure.  Venezuela also benefitted from its large oil revenues which allowed the government to pay for unorthodox policies and to launch a dizzying series of social programs, again with much waste and little in the way of benefits.  The transition to socialism followed the ‘frog in boiling water” strategy.  Until recent years, President Chavez benefitted from a political opposition which had been widely criticized while in power and which  had difficulties in rallying behind a coherent governing program.

Lower level regional players gravitating in the same orbit include Presidents Morales in Boliva, Correa in Ecuador and Ortega in Nicaragua.  While each of these countries is driven by somewhat different dynamics, their current leaders have benefitted from their predecessors inability to overcome widespread poverty.

For most of the decade, the shortcomings of these countries (the “Atlantic Group”) were masked by booming commodity prices plus, in the case of Brazil, the dividends of the Cardoso years.  And if their decline has taken years, it is because it has taken time for the larger countries to run down their wealth.

In contrast, the “Pacific Rim” countries - Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico - running more open and liberal political systems, adopted a development model where foreign direct investment was encouraged and where domestic demand provided some balance to exports.  Perhaps the most striking example has been Peru, whose president once ran on a quasi-socialist platform and enjoyed the open support of President Chavez.  Once in power however, he has adopted a balanced approach, negotiating an increase in the state share of mining sector profits, reforming and expanding the private pension system and generally trying to raise standards of living.  In so doing, he surprised many, including me.  Once the Latin economies are measured in real terms, it is clear that the Pacific Rim countries enjoyed a much better decade than their Atlantic counterparts.

What next?

The current health problems of President Chavez mark the end of an era.  Certainly, he has been the most media-savvy regional leader, and thanks to ample oil revenues, its most influential.  Should he leave the scene, it is not assured that Chavismo will collapse quickly: half of the population idolizes him, his entourage exercises very close control over both the population and the military.  The most immediate danger to Chavismo is probably internal division.  Regionally, it is likely that Venezuela’s influence and ideology will recede; as commentator Moises Naim observed, there is no one in Venezuela with Chavez’ charisma or absolute control over the petrodollars spigot.  This will mostly affect Ecuador’s Correa and Nicaragua’s Ortega.  As to Bolivia, it will likely have to rebuild its bridges with Brazil.

Argentina’s economy, even measured in overvalued pesos, barely grew in 2012.  The government has little money left to distribute, foreign creditors are more wary than ever (thanks to the activism of some and to rising provincial debt defaults), some of its historic political allies are rebelling, the population is upset by strict exchange controls and poor economic results.  The oil sector is at a strategic standstill, with YPF taking control of the upstream and of some related businesses (such as utilities), and investors such as Bridas, Chevron and others, driving a very hard bargain to provide capex financing.  Energy imports are soaring, which means that energy subsidies are getting even more expensive.  It seems to me that the government will have to adopt more orthodox economic policies (settling with Repsol, raising energy prices, improving the terms of crop exports, devaluing the peso) to prevent a deep recession and social turmoil.  That in turn will inevitably impact the political sphere.

Brazil is discovering the limits and high costs of government intervention.  Its state champions have become uninvestable; incessant currency manipulation is affecting funding costs; credit policy has been incoherent with the official development bank, BNDES, offering long-term development loans at rates comparable with overnight rates (in effect, the resulting policy is akin to driving with  a foot on the accelerator and the other on the brake).  Finally, companies find it very costly to run through the maze of bureaucracy and state and federal tax regulations.  More worrisome, Brazil is leading a Mercosur that is attracting inward-looking economies which, not by chance, also are the worst performing.  Just like no team will ever win the World Cup by focusing mostly on defense, the Mercosur is destined to failure unless it aspires to international competitivity based on its comparative advantages.

This is in clear contrast with the Pacific Rim of the region.

It is quite remarkable how far Mexico has come.  Back in the 1980s, in the depth of the Latin debt crisis, Mexico launched its maquiladora  experiment.  In those days, it was little more than assembly plants located just across the US border.  Since then, Mexico has joined NAFTA which had two very large benefits: ensuring the continuation of democracy and opening up the US market.  The results have been quite extraordinary, despite pervasive security problems due to internal drug wars.

Once Colombia regained control over most of its territory from the FARC, ELN and drug gangs, and was able to ensure security, the economy took off.  Thanks to its large population, it was not overly dependent on commodities, even though it benefitted from high global demand for oil, coal, nickel and other raw materials.  Reasonable investment policies caused a boom in both the mining and the oil and gas sectors.  Poverty levels were lowered by more than half in a decade.  Finally, competent fiscal and monetary policies have pushed inflation down to levels which would have been unthinkable not so long ago.  Long repressed, and fuelled by rising standards of living, construction has been on a long term growth path.

In our modern era of instant communications and diminished official control over information, the good and the bad news travel easily and fast.  So do people.  Indeed, part of the reason why Venezuela will not be able to sustain its regional influence is that its most capable people have been leaving.

It is becoming increasingly evident to people in Argentina that the country is on the wrong track.  Venezuela is deeply divided, and social (and therefore political) pressure will continue to mount.  Brazil is a more complicated case because of its sheer size and greater degree of economic and political freedom; but its GDP growth is lackluster, the PT has suffered from a succession of embarrassing scandals and foreign investment is slowing down.  It seems to me that President Rousseff will need to change tack if she wants to be successful.

This is not to say that the Pacific Rim is home free.  President Humala in Peru must deliver on his promises of a Third Way.  Colombia can’t rely on oil, coal, metals and construction forever; it must accelerate its investments in industry, agribusiness and infrastructure.  Chile must preserve its free-market policies as their enter their fourth decade.  Most of all, the world economy needs to recover because emerging markets can’t rely on domestic demand alone to growth fast.

But for the last ten years, the liberal economies of Latin America have done much better than the rest, and in the age of the Internet, budget airlines and TV, this is not lost on the people.  As historic leaders such as Castro, Lula and Chavez leave center stage, realities come into sharper focus while tales lose their aura.  Overall, this is good for the region, and it gives reason for optimism.



[1]  Source: Bloomberg.

Monday, November 12, 2012

Argentine inflections

Anticipating inflection points is the Holy Grail of investing: we all know that past trends, up or down, will not continue indefinitely; at some point, the curve will bend and change direction.  But when? 

When will the fundamentals of a company start to show an improvement after sustained restructuring efforts by its management?  When will financial markets start assigning to a company a stock price that is closer to its intrinsic value?  And more challenging still, when will a country abandon failed policies to save itself from chaos?

Argentina is the perfect – some may say terrible – example of a country that has followed bad economic policies for much longer than deemed possible.  Indeed, how bad these policies have been remains unrecognized abroad: not so long ago, I recall some reputed economists stating that the 2005 Argentine debt renegotiation was a model for Greece, that the Argentine economy was growing at a healthy clip.

That is nonsense, but the question remains as to why Argentina seems to defy gravity, and why it has done it for so long?  Two reasons may be given.

One is that Argentina’s growth is illusory.  Measured in US dollars, it is greatly exaggerated because of an “obese” official peso/dollar rate which stands today at 4.78.  This is to be compared with the implicit rate of around 7 when one compares the stock prices of Argentine companies on the local and New York exchanges.  In other words, the peso is overvalued by some 45%; this led the Colombian minister of finance to brag that, measured at true exchange rates, his country’s GDP had overtaken Argentina’s.

The other is that the Argentine government has picked the pockets of everyone in sight:  foreign creditors were squeezed in 2005 in a restructuring in which they lost 75% of their money; private pension funds were nationalized and their resources used to finance the public deficit; energy prices were frozen to subsidize consumer spending; official inflation calculations were fudged, defrauding everybody (and independent economists were heavily fined when their findings departed from the official ones[1]); more recently, insurance companies were forced to finance government-designated projects, foreign exchange controls were implemented to try and stop capital flight and the largest oil and gas company, YPF, was expropriated and no compensation has been paid to date.

As Mexican president Calderon said shortly after the YPF grab, anybody thinking of investing in Argentina should have his head examined. 

Despite grabbing other people’s money, Argentina is paying a very steep price for its policies. 

The refusal by Argentina to pay holders of non-restructured sovereign bonds has kept it from international financial markets since 2001.  After announcing an ambitious investment program, YPF, unable to tap these markets for billion dollar issues can only raise $100 million at a time locally; it is also unable to attract international partners to develop the vast Vaca Muerta shale oil deposits[2] because of the uneconomic pricing of hydrocarbons and pending lawsuits from Repsol[3]; electric utilities are on the verge of bankruptcy; and the ubiquitous intervention of the government in the economy has led to widespread corruption.

Starved for money and growth, Argentine companies carry low valuations.  That, plus the limited remaining number of pockets to be picked has led sophisticated investors to bet on a policy inflection point.  Eton Park, one of the most prominent US hedge funds, built a substantial stake in YPF between September 2010 and March 2012.  I estimate their average purchase price at around $40[4].  The stock closed today at $10.46.  When rumors of expropriation started to surface last April, I was tempted to buy the stock as I thought the government wouldn’t have the money to take the company over.  I just couldn’t imagine that they would just grab it, but they did.

Yet I think that we are getting close enough to an inflection point to dip a toe in Argentina.  I see three reasons for that. 

One is that having taken control of YPF, officially because its former controlling owner (Repsol) didn’t invest enough, the government now “is it”.  In other words, it must show it can succeed where others failed; it needs to attract deep-pocketed oil and gas multinationals as partners, but for that it must (1) improve hydrocarbon pricing, (2) settle with Repsol and (3) regain access to international debt markets.  This looks to me like a chicken-and-egg situation as to what comes first, a major oil joint-venture or the above three-point policy change.  Meanwhile, the clock is ticking because Argentina, once an energy exporter, is now an importer.

Second, the 2005 restructuring saga is turning sour.  Having the Navy frigate Libertad seized in a Ghanaian port is acutely embarrassing for the Argentine government and begs the question: what next? If Ghana is not safe, what more restrictive measures will the government have to apply to its movable assets?  Furthermore, the recent decision by a US judge that Argentina must pay interest on all of its external debt, including that portion which was not restructured, raises the pressure as it carries the threat of escalation in case of non-compliance.  Granted, Argentina has so far been able to delay the execution of court decisions, but it can’t expect to do so forever.  Justice may be slow but it is not dumb.

Finally and perhaps more importantly, the Argentine people are showing growing signs of opposition to the government policies.  The harsh measures taken to effectively prevent them from buying US dollars have been received , and this is understandable in a cvery badlyountry where there is little faith in the willingness of the government to pay its debts, and where real inflation is on the order of 25% p.a.  High profile corruption cases, where government members appear to have enriched themselves illegally, are especially grating when popular unemployment is high.

A large currency depreciation may be the next step, rather than better economic policies.  However this would only diminish people’s savings and living standard, which would hardly be helpful in president Kirchner’s bid to amend the Constitution in order to run for a third term.

As the above diagnosis may still be a bit optimistic - after all, Peronism in its current incarnation still has many followers - one has to look at valuation and to what extent it mitigates the risks to be undertaken.

In the case of YPF, the main risk is really that of full nationalization, a close second being delisting from the NYSE (since one buys the ADR at a 45% discount to the local share price).  Looking at its ADR stock price, YPF looks pretty cheap compared to its government-controlled peers:  Ecopetrol (Colombia) and Petrobras (Brazil):
 

 
Ecopetrol
Petrobras
YPF
 
 
 
 
Market value (bn)
$115.3
$131.1
$4.1
Proven reserves (bn barrels)
1.9
12.9
1.0
Daily production (‘000 of  boe)
719
2,463
467
EV/boe of proven reserves[5]
$61.6
$15.28
$6.36
EV/boe of daily production
$162,880
$80,007
$13,615

 Of course, the above calculations are very rough and do not take into account non-upstream assets such as refineries, pipelines and other long term investments.  But they are informative nevertheless.  For example, while Ecopetrol and Petrobras have similar market values, the former has zero net debt while the latter is burdened by excessive debts.  Still, YPF looks quite cheap.

 YPF faces two specific challenges: as an oil champion under government control, it is in the quasi permanent threat of having its management and strategies politicized; it also faces a very onerous investment program.  Another, less politically risky way of playing the “Argentine inflection point”, is Telecom Argentina (TEO).

The controlling shareholder is a holding that includes Telecom Italia and the well regarded Wertheim group from Argentina.  TEO is well managed and has strong financials.  It is the second largest telecom company in Argentina after Claro (controlled by Carlos Slim’s America Movil).  Its investment needs are more modest than YPF’s on a relative basis. It has a lower profile than YPF.  Finally, its ADRs enjoy a similar discount to local shares.  On a per mobile subscriber basis, it is worth less than one tenth of America Movil.

As history shows, populist governments rarely act in an economically rational way; when they control rich countries, and when they resort to reprehensible policies, they can endure far longer than orthodox thinkers imagine.  But even they cannot repel the laws of gravity forever.  They usually don’t see the light or change their ways; their rule generally ends when they can no longer afford handouts and resort to heavy handed policies to stay in power.

I have started to build small positions in YPF and Telecom Argentina.



[1]   It is ironic that one of them was the former minister of finance who had presided over the heavy-handed foreign debt renegotiation.
[2]   Which YPF estimates to hold 23 billion barrels of oil resources.
[3]   The Spanish company whose controlling shareholding of YPF was seized by the Argentine government this year.
[4]   Based on the average prices during the periods in which Eton Park reported building its stake.
[5]  EV: Enterprise value, i.e. market capitalization – cash and equivalents + debts.  For YPF we have used the official exchange rate to convert debt amounts to US dollars since most of these are dollar denominated to begin with.