Showing posts with label natural gas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label natural gas. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Latin America in 2014: part III, fin de fiesta


Argentina

Cinephiles of a certain age may remember the 1960 film, Fin de Fiesta[1] by the Argentinean producer and director Leopoldo Torre Nilsson. I certainly do, for its powerful script and black and white cinematography.

Ostensibly set in the 1930s, the movie recounted the excesses of a provincial caudillo, his brutal and corrupt exercise of power and his downfall.  The fact that the film’s opening was marred by public disturbances showed that, for many, this was not a movie about an age long gone.

And why not, for it held a mirror to Argentine politics where the reprehensible practices of the pre-WWII governments were replicated by others of different stripes in the following decades, where corporatism flourished, tinged later by populism, and where moderates always failed to marginalize right-wing and left-wing radicals; Frondizi (1958-1962), Alfonsin (1983-1989) and Menem (1989-1999) come to mind in this regard.

Almost seven decades after its eponym was elected president, Peronism is again in power, alive if not all that well, in Argentina.  And as happened in the past, another fin de fiesta is in the offing.

Despite enormous natural riches, over the last decade Argentina has managed to put itself in an economic hole by following a populist ideology which has resulted in huge distortions of and burdens on its economy and finances.  It has alienated almost anyone with money to invest or consume: foreign creditors were rudely handled in a 2005 restructuring which looked more like spoliation; retirees saw their private pensions taken over by the government and used to plug budgetary holes and finance YPF; frozen energy tariffs threatened the financial health of a whole sector of the economy; Repsol, the controlling shareholder of YPF was initially expropriated without any compensation; statistical data bases, essential for the management of private business and finance were either tampered with, such as the inflation rate[2], or simply not kept up to date.

The results have been telling:  while it exported 20 million m³/day of natural gas to its neighbors in 2004 (one year into Nestor Kirchner’s presidency), in July 2013[3] Argentina imported 16.9 million m³/day from Bolivia and the equivalent of 27 million m³/day in LNG[4].  The picture is similar for oil: Argentina turned from being a net exporter of US$5.2 billion in 2004 to a net importer of US$3 billion in 2013[5]; these numbers understate the turn for the worse because 2004 oil prices were less than half of those in 2013.

As for electricity, by freezing utility rates in 2002, the government triggered high demand growth [6] while setting strong deterrents for investments in new generation[7].  It is also facing a mounting bill for rate subsidies which currently exceeds 3% of GDP for electricity and natural gas alone.  In short, the reality is: pressure on public finances and recurring blackouts in summer.

The erratic management of the economy and its finances has led to general underinvestment, the effects of which go well beyond the energy sector: a potentially high value-adding sector such as industry has been forced into retreat; the local automobile industry is now barely more than an assembly line where valuable components are imported from abroad.  The overall result is a rising need to increase imports when the country can least afford it, hence the never ending import tariffs, taxes and other restrictions to try and keep the trade balance in the black.

It is clear that the external situation of Argentina is unsustainable.  Official foreign exchange reserves stand at US$29 billion.  The IMF estimates that the country will suffer a cumulative current account deficit of US$29.1 billion over the next four years.  It cannot access international markets to raise debt financing.  Assuming that foreign direct investments were to remain flat at US$3 billion a year[8], this would leave Argentina with reserves of US$12 billion by year-end 2018, equivalent to a little over 2 months of imports.  Needless to say, a financial meltdown would occur well before that point.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the government decided to depreciate the peso by some 18% last week.  It is also hardly surprising that the government blamed speculators for its miseries.  While this move may provide some temporary respite, it will not be enough: the roots of the difficulties, excessive public spending, haven’t been dealt with, the government has little credibility and seems to improvise as it goes along[9].

In the end, these latest announcements show that the populist peronist economic model is reaching its limits.  The current government will likely be forced to make further policy adjustments to try and attract foreign money[10] and reduce public accounts imbalances; after coming to terms with Repsol in order to permit YPF to develop shale oil resources, Argentina is likely going to have to do the same with holders of its unrestructured foreign debt.  It will then need to make peace with exporters. 

Real reforms will need a government that enjoys more credibility and trust both at home and abroad.  That is for 2015/2016 perhaps, but the pendulum has started to swing back.  More and more, the priority of this government will be to reach 2015 without causing a massive economic and social breakdown.
 



[1]  Literally, the end of the party.
[2]  IMF issued a rare warning to Argentina for its poor handling of official statistics.
[3]  Up from 9.7 million m³/day a year earlier.  Bolivian gas imports are limited by pipeline capacity.  They are planned to increase to over 19 million m³/day shortly.  Current exports have plummeted to a few hundred thousands of cubic meters
[4]  Ource: Platts.
[5]  IMF projections.
[6]  CAMMESA, the wholesale market administrator, estimated in 2008 that, on average, electricity tariffs in Argentina were 1/3 of the Latin American average.
[7]  The government has made some tariff adjustments since then.
[8]  A puny number when compared to Colombia (US$15 billion, Mexico US$40 billion and Brazil US$50 billion).
[9]  A 20% surtax on the newly but limited purchases of dollars, was subsequently waived if these dollars were deposited at a bank for at least one year.  The much hyped possibility for individuals to buy dollars for savings purposes failed to convince as these dollars would have to remain in a bank account and Argentines remember what happened to their dollar accounts in 2001-2002 with the “corralito”.
[10]  Including dollars held abroad by Argentines.

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

US Energy Realities

 
The recent spike in crude oil prices has made it clear, once again, how much the US are dependent on imported energy. The Solyndra fiasco has shown how illusory the promise of readily available, cheap and clean renewable energy really was, at least for now.

One day perhaps, we will be able to generate wind and solar power effectively, cheaply and reliably enough so that it will become a significant component of our national power infrastructure. By“effectively” I mean without having to cover hundreds of square miles of land with solar panels or wind farms; by “cheaply”I mean without having to offer large subsidies or tax breaks; by “reliably” I mean without having to build backup conventional power plants to make up for the very low capacity factor inherent, so far, in these alternative power sources.

This may take two or three decades before becoming a reality, or it may never happen. Right now, it makes little sense to spend considerable sums of money at a time when federal and local government finances are strapped to promote “new” energy sources that are not ready for prime time. Furthermore, we have two much better (meaning cheaper, more scalable, and environmentally friendlier in my view) sources of energy: natural gas and nuclear.

The US has plentiful reserves of conventional, offshore and shale gas; the US also has great expertise in building and operating nuclear power plants, and Canadian uranium deposits are more secure than Middle Eastern oil and very large.

The following table prepared by the Department of Energy compares the all-in cost/levelized[1]of producing one megawatthour from new plants to be built today and starting operations in 2016. In this first table, the DOE doesn’t differentiate between more favorable and less favorable locations but takes a national average. Alternative energy (wind and solar) are showed at real costs, meaning without the benefit of tax breaks or other incentives.
 

Levelized cost of new generation (2009 US$/mwhr)
 

Plant type
Capacity factor
Total system levelized cost
Advanced coal
85
$109.7
Advanced coal w/CCS[2]
85
$136.5
Natural gas –  Advanced CC
87
$62.2
Nat gas – Adv. CC w/CCS
87
$88.4
Advanced nuclear
90
$114
Wind - offshore
34
$243.7
Wind
34
$96.1
Solar photo-voltaic
25
$269.3
Solar thermal
18
$312.2
Geothermal
91
$99.8





We can draw a few preliminary conclusions from this table:

1. Natural gas is the cheapest option, even after adding the cost of carbon capture and sequestration, with geothermal close behind;

2. Solar is much more expensive than any other option;

3. Wind offshore (where there is little NIMBY opposition) is very expensive while onshore (which carries much higher NIMBY opposition) seems a competitive option;

4. Nuclear is cheaper than coal (and doesn’t pollute) and not so far behind the likes of geothermal, nat gas and onshore wind.

However, it is very important to realize that the above costs are those of the energy produced; they do not include the costs of ensuring that the country is reliably supplied with electricity. When wind farms only produce energy 34% of the time, some other power plant must be built to supply energy during the other 66%. The capacity factors show a very wide difference in the ability of various sources of energy to reliably produce energy.

To assess the true costs of each energy source, we must factor the cost of backup power. We will assume that backup energy is produced by combined cycle power plants equipped with CCS (as it typically is). To compare all options, we will adjust the costs of each plant type so as to reach the equivalent of a 91% capacity factor. We do not include the (high) costs of building extra transmission lines to connect the backup power plants. Nevertheless, the results are telling, as the following table shows:

Levelized and equalized cost of new generation (2009 US$/mwhr)
 

Plant type
Adj. capa. factor
Total system levelized cost
Advanced coal w/CCS[3]
91
$114.9
Nat gas – Adv. CC w/CCS
91
$91.3
Advanced nuclear
91
$114.7
Wind - offshore
91
$348
Wind
91
$200.4
Solar photo-voltaic
91
$433.5
Solar thermal
91
$564.5
Geothermal
91
$99.8

 Once these adjustments are made, it becomes very clear that there are only three types of power plants that are relatively clean, almost always on, and cheap: combined cycle gas turbines with CCS, geothermal and nuclear. As I said earlier, the cost of transmission lines is not included in the above figures, understating the comparative advantages of the three leaders.

While geothermal looks very attractive and is being developed in California and elsewhere, its potential is limited by geology.

Some may argue that, cost-wise, onshore wind is “only” twice as expensive as the leaders. The problem is scalability and land usage. Wind farms occupy huge areas of land compared to natural gas and nuclear plants.  They also pose environmental problems, such as noise, and they have an adverse impact on the value of properties in their vicinities.

As for solar plants, while technology is advancing rapidly, they are still very inefficient and consequently anti-economical.  They also occupy too much land.  Their future may lie at the individual habitat level; but even then, the wide fluctuation in their output would necessitate large investments in smart counters and transmission power lines.

The DOE levelized cost numbers are based on national averages; it is worth mentioning that in the case of wind and solar, location has a much bigger impact on costs than for nuclear or gas-fired. In other words, the gap in levelized costs between the most favorable and unfavorable location/region is much broader. This means that scalability is further constrained.


Range in levelized costs (not equalized)
 

Plant type
Minimum
Average
Maximum
(Max-Min)/Av%
Nat gas – Adv. CC w/CCS
$79.8
$88.4
$102.7
25.9%
Advanced nuclear
$109.8
$114
$121.6
10.4%
Wind - offshore
$187.1
$243.7
$350
66.8%
Wind
$82.3
$96.1
$115.5
34.6%
Solar photo-voltaic
$158.9
$211
$324.4
78.4%
Solar thermal
$192
$312.2
$642.5
144.3%
Geothermal
$85.7
$99.8
$115.8
30.2%

Finally, there is the reality of where we are starting from. In 2011, the name plate capacity of our power plants (not including hydro, oil-fired) was as follows:
 

Name plate capacity in gigawatts
 

Plant type
Capacity
Coal
342.3
Natural gas
467.2
Nuclear
106.7
Wind
39.5
Solar
1
Geothermal
2.4

Given the limited scalability and high levelized costs as well as the dire financial condition of the federal and local governments, it doesn’t make sense to push renewable as hard as we currently are. It is my view that nuclear and natural gas will eventually win the day.

At present, rock-bottom US natural gas prices are wrecking havoc on gassy E&P companies, accelerating the switch from coal to gas-fired power plants and generally compressing the profit margins of merchant power producers. Over time, the price of natural gas is bound to rise for three reasons:

1. Supply will be reduced as it is unprofitable for most E&P companies to drill for more gas; witness the cutbacks already announced by the likes of Chesapeake Energy and Southwestern Energy;

2. Domestic use of gas will increase, be it in the power sector, in some areas of transport or in the chemical industry. To that end, very large investments in plant and equipment have already started; witness Dow Chemical for example;

3. Globally, there is a huge arbitrage opportunity to be exploited: LNG sells in Asia at $13 to $16/mbtu; US gas sells for $2.5 at Henry Hub; the cost of liquefying the gas and transporting it to Asia is about $6. From Louisiana to British Columbia, we see a major drive to build gas liquefaction plants and export terminals. We also see some slowdown in new LNG projects in Australia when these were deemed "no-brainers" a decade ago.

Nuclear power suffers from the fallouts of the Fukushima accident and the past laxity of Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO), the plants’ operator. But the economics are there for all to see. So are the politics. It makes little sense for Europe to trade some of the energy security afforded by nuclear plants for an increase dependence on Russian imports and volatile crude oil prices[4]. For the US, and with the possible exception of some Californian locations, nuclear power is very safe, and indeed the industry has an excellent safety record, Three Mile Island included.

This is a long game; it could take three years or more before the US nat gas market regains its equilibrium and the specter of Fukushima recedes from collective memories. But besides the objective merits of these energy sources, I feel comforted by American psyche and free markets. In this country, arbitrage opportunities tend to be exploited quickly, and there is abundant capital to be put to work. Indeed, the gap may be closed faster than we think as America often "over-does it" and rushes along. Perhaps the best example of this has been shale gas, while the worst has been financial derivatives.

In my view, the stock price of natural gas and uranium producers is too low; the same is true of merchant power producers that operate natural gas or nuclear plants. I am long these stocks.
 



[1] The DOE first calculates the costs of building, operating, fuel and maintenance a power plant over a 30 year cycle. It then takes their present value and spreads them equally and annually. Inflation is taken out by expressing these values in real US dollars of 2009. Hence the term “levelized”.

[2] CCS: carbon control and sequestration.

[3] CCS: carbon control and sequestration.

[4] Most natural gas imports from Russia are pegged to crude oil, albeit with a 6 to 9 month lag.