
Men are so honest, so thoroughly square;
Eternally noble, historically fair;
Who, when you win, will always give your back a pat.
Why can't a woman be like that?...
Henry:
Well, why can't a woman be like us?[1]
So the first steps in the third bail out of Greece were
taken last weekend. The terms of this
new deal are hard and grating on the Greeks, but the perspective of lending up
to €90 billion to a country which has caused private creditors to lose €105
billion in 2012, and which will likely need tens of billions of debt
forgiveness from eurozone members should also be grating on European taxpayers.
Above all, there is little trust that, this time
around, Greece will change its economic model to fit in the eurozone, relying
instead on the reluctance of other members to pull the plug. The Greeks already
went through a lot of pain, yet they have nothing to show for it. PM Tsipras declared that he didn’t believe in
the reforms which were demanded of Greece.
Chancellor Merkel could be forgiven if asked, “Why can’t Greece be more like us?”
Contrary to most commentaries, the main problem of
Greece is not the excessive burden of its public debt but its lack of economic competitiveness. As explained in a previous post, its debts
mature over 30 years, interest rate thereon is very low and payment thereof is
partly deferred; that is not much of a burden.
Besides, Greece has had a primary budget deficit, that is a deficit
before taking into account the payment of interest on its debts.
This time around, the euro safety net has grown so
tenuous that either Greece accepts to make big changes now, or it is forced to
leave. Even then, absent changes, it would
experience a painful drop in living standards.
The needed changes are huge, the government is ideologically
opposed to them, the Greek population is no more enthusiastic, and time is
short. Yet Greece could find examples of
small countries within the eurozone which successfully reformed their
economies, and did so with far less outside financial assistance and in a
relatively short period of time.
I am talking of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. Having won their
independence from the USSR, these countries switched from a centrally planned soviet
economic system to one open to the rest of the world.
What is remarkable however is that the bulk
of the reforms took only five years (1992-1997)!
The essential policies that allowed the “Baltic
Miracle”, with some variation in emphasis and timing, can be summarized as
follows:
·
Anchoring the currencies either via a
peg[2]
(Latvia, Lithuania) or a currency board[3]
(Estonia), to control inflation;
·
Reforming and simplifying the tax system
with a combination of lower - sometimes single flat - income tax rates for
individuals and corporations[4]
and of VAT taxes. This, combined with
prudent public spending helped bring budget balance close to equilibrium[5];
·
Liberalizing prices and markets, and in
the case of Estonia, opening up its economy to imports by eliminating tariffs
and quotas[6];
·
Privatizating state enterprises to
reduce the overwhelming size of inefficient public sectors, make the transition
to free markets difficult to reverse, and bring fresh capital into the economy. In Estonia, privatization was carried out via
international tenders to choose a core/majority investor for a given company
and then via the voucher system to attract minority shareholders. Lithuania used the voucher system. On
average, over the 1993-1997 period, annual government revenues from privatizations
averaged of 3.4% of GDP.
·
Reforming the pension systems, between
2001 and 2004 with a combination of (1) a solidarity scheme based on Social
Security contributions, (2) mandatory personal funded retirement accounts, and
(3) discretionary personal retirements accounts.
Critics will point out that the Baltic States’
economies shrunk more that the rest of Europe’s in 2009. They did.
Clearly they had allowed bubbles to grow, and they were constrained by
their strict monetary systems[7]. But that doesn’t take anything away from the
remarkable and successful efforts undertaken in the 1990s, before some
complacency crept in.
Furthermore, one should note that the
Baltics also responded positively to the 2009 crisis by pushing forward deeper
reforms in their pension systems and keeping a lid on their budgets.
By 2014, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s
budget balances were +0.6%, -1.4% and -0.7% respectively. This compares favorably with France (-4%),
Greece (-3.5%), Italy (-3%), Portugal (-4.5%) and Spain (-5.8%) for example[8].
Today, the Baltics enjoy faster economic growth, far
lower debt levels and healthier employment than Greece.
In conclusion, small democratic countries can and
indeed have made profound reforms in their economies, with great success. The key ingredients were:
1. Facing
an even greater danger (Russia for the Baltics, implosion for Greece?),
2. Having
the support of their population,3. Ensuring that their governments and technocrats believed in free-markets,
4. Applying shock therapy and speed.
Greece has #1.
It lacks #2 and #3, but it is its choice whether to change or not. Smaller, worse off European countries did. And in Athens, economic advisers from Tallinn will be more welcome than those from Frankfurt.
[1] My Fair Lady
– An Hymn to Him.
[2] Latvia pegged
its currency to the SDR while Lithuania pegged his to the US dollar.
[3] Here the
anchor was the German Deutsche Mark.
[4] In 2000 the Estonian
system was modified to tax corporations only on their distributed profits (as
Chile did in the 1980s). Lithuania
adopted an income tax abatement on reinvested corporate profits.
[5] Except for the
period 2010-2012 where the deficit grew to around 9%. However the same policies greatly helped
bring the budget deficits to around zero in 2014.
[6] In subsequent
years, Estonia negotiated bilateral agreements and joined the EU which watered
down this policy a bit.
[7] Estonia joined
the eurozone in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015.
[8] Source:
Eurostat.
No comments:
Post a Comment