
As I wanted to retrieve some of the data from my
original iMac and had bungled my first attempt, I called Apple’s hot line;
their specialist couldn’t have been more helpful. I also wanted to synchronize my iPod, and
there, things got messier. One staff at
the Apple store told me that I could do that.
But when I called Apple’s hot line again, the new specialist declined to
help, suggesting that I bring my new iMac, the hard disk drive of my old iMac
and my iPod, all thirty pounds of them, to an Apple store for further
assistance. I was not happy.
The change of computer also necessitated the
transfer of some Adobe programs which required the de-authorization of my
previous iMac. The Adobe customer
support person was efficient and told me that I would receive by email a link
to rate his service. I did, but I was
very surprised to see that the questionnaire also asked about my satisfaction
with similar support service from Apple.
Clearly, the questionnaire was not tailor-made for me, but it made me
wonder: besides its ongoing Flash Player saga, did Adobe know something I didn’t
about Apple customer service?

Today, much was made of the Apple CEO’s apology for
installing a poorly performing mapping application. In my view, he should have apologized for not
giving his customers an informed choice of upgrading or not. In this instance, a company that prided
itself on being customer focused, sacrificed its customers to its ongoing battle
with Google. Which brings the question,
aesthetics apart, if Apple justifies its premium pricing on providing a premium
experience, what happens when this experience (technical assistance or software
upgrade) starts to falter?
The final thing was the release of the latest RIMM
quarterly results. Much has been
commented already. Suffice to say that
the loss (ex-goodwill impairment) was lower than expected, cash holdings were
slightly increased despite selling devices at a loss (thanks to cost cutting
and a reduction in working capital due to business shrinking), sales fell
sharply from a year ago but the subscriber base increased at an annualized rate
of 10% quarter-over-quarter.
Earlier this week, RIMM’s management disclosed some
of the features of its upcoming Blackberry 10.
Even to a non-geek like me, the upcoming RIMM smart phone looked sleek
and well thought out. Will it have many
meaningful applications? Will it have
something comparable to Skype or Apple’s Facetime? I don’t know.
A keyboard and a touch screen versions are set for release during the
first quarter of next year.
At the time of this writing, RIMM has no debt and a
market value of US$3.9 billion. Net of
cash, its enterprise (or business) value is US$1.6 billion. This works out to US$20.4 per customer. In other words, the company is priced as if
it were going bankrupt.
Yet, it looks like the company has the financial
resources to produce the BB10. It also
looks like it will have the resources to market it, as it will receive financial
support from carriers that are anxious to reduce Apple’s negotiating leverage
and interested in having a wider smart phone offering. It is true that RIMM runs far behind Apple
and Android-powered phones and that it is unlikely to catch them any time soon,
if ever. But it does have strengths,
apart from his new technology: a secure network, a hardcore customer base, and
excellence in text messaging.
We already have a “going out of business” value estimate for RIMM: US$1.6 billion.
What if it makes it?
That is very difficult to estimate, in part because RIMM has already
announced that it will strike alliances and licensing agreements with third
parties which will share the downside as well as the upside of the BB10 and
beyond.
If we look at Apple, we can make some very rough
estimates: its revenue per iPhone is about US$660, its gross margin US$ 430 and
its net profit after-tax US$270. Using a
p/e multiple of 13, each one million iPhone sold would have a market value of
US$3.5 billion. Analysts expect that it
will sell over 160 million units in 2013.
RIMM is not the market leader that Apple is, its new
BB10 may be priced lower than the iPhone 5, its leverage with sub-contractors
is much weaker, and as we already pointed out, it has decided to share some of
its upside. So for argument’s sake we
will assume that its normalized net profit/BB10 unit will be US$150; using an
arbitrary p/e multiple of 11 and assuming that RIMM sells 10 million new phones
a year, its market value would then be US$16.5 billion (I assume that all
excess cash balances will have been consumed to ramp up the business).
I think that it will make it. I also fear that Apple may be starting to suffer
from the kind of hubris which stellar performers almost inevitably fall into,
sooner or later. Putting it all
together, I see more upside with RIMM than with Apple, even considering the
very steep challenges that the former is facing.
I am long RIMM and have no position in Apple.
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