
I have been following this
bank for several years, as it seemed to provide straight forward banking
services internationally and made a good return in so doing. Management seemed quite competent. Finally, the fact that it had acquired what
remained of American Express Bank Ltd. where I spent the first 16 years of my
professional career added to my interest.
Actually, I was looking for a good entry point to invest in its stock.
However, the misdeeds that it
allegedly committed and apparently did not contest as well as what has
transpired so far about its senior management’s conduct have led me to suspend
any investment attempt.
Essentially, the bank was
accused of willingly defying US regulations forbidding banks to channel money
of sanctioned countries such as Iran through the US. The DFS accused it of laundering more than
$250 billion over several years through its US banking operations, of falsifying
internal records to prevent regulators from tracing the identity of its Iranian
clients and of filing untrue reports.
That a major bank decide, in a very big way, to defy the laws of its host
country is simply baffling.
The reaction of senior and
top management in this whole affair further raised alarm bells in my mind. There was of course the now infamous email
exchange between the Head of US operations and his superior in which the former
clearly outlined the dangers of the bank’s course of action and the latter
replied “who these f*** Americans think
they are to tell us what to do”.
There was also the truculent initial response to the DFS action stating
that only $14 million of transfers had been mishandled and that the bank was
contemplating countersuing for damage to its reputation! This from a bank that had been under Federal
oversight from 2004 to 2007 for money laundering. Then, in short order, the bank agreed to settle
with the DFS, paying $340 million and accepting renewed oversight. As Butch Cassidy asked the Sundance Kid in
the eponymous movie, “Who are these guys”?
What is worrying in this case
is that this is not an instance where a low level trader decides to go
rogue. It is likely that the decision to
continue doing business with Iran was vetted by the very top management; the Board
of Directors was probably at least aware of the decision/policy, and if it was
not, then more serious questions must be asked.
What management decides to choose Iran over the US? What kind of senior manager blurts out the f***
word when referring to the Congress of a host country? So far, I find no reassuring answers. Either we are dealing with a culture or a
strategic problem.
The cultural hypothesis is
that the top echelons of the bank include throwbacks to the Indian days of the British
Empire, except that New York is not a remote outpost in the bush. When a senior manager not only refuses to
listen to his country manager’s cogent alert and advice but also responds with
unrestrained fury, when the corporation lets it be known of its intent to
counter sue its regulator for damage to its reputation, under the circumstances,
I, for one, wonder about the culture of the place.
The strategic hypothesis is that
the bank’s main focus is emerging markets, many of which, by definition, are
less closely regulated than developed ones, often condone business practices which would be frown upon elsewhere, and in some cases are governed by
regimes which are not models of good behavior.
New York is important to the bank for providing access to the US dollar
system, but the Americas-Europe-UK segment accounted for only 10% of Standard’s
operating income in 2011. In that sense,
and in my view, the bank probably has a higher risk profile than generally
acknowledged.
Bottom line, the US
regulatory and judicial process is not over by a long shot as the Federal
Reserve, Treasury and the Justice Department are still to conclude their own
enforcement actions. I am among those who
applaud the DFS decision to go public and break the apparently stalled multi-party
negotiations. I found the allegations
against the bank shocking (called me an old-fashioned banker).
Finally, having myself spent most of
my banking and investing careers in emerging markets, I have come to
the conclusion that the Standard Chartered business model is riskier than
previously thought, and more importantly, that such higher risk profile is
unlikely to be easily reduced.
At some point under the right circumstances and at the right price, the bank may become an interesting investment or trading idea.
At some point under the right circumstances and at the right price, the bank may become an interesting investment or trading idea.